Evolutsia.Net

Caucasus Watch is a biweekly roundup focusing on the region’s major stories. The project is led by Analyst Remy Gwaramadze with support from the entire Evolutsia.Net team. The next issue of Caucasus Watch will be published on January 17th. This issue’s late publication was due to the holidays.

In this issue, Analysts Inge Snip and Remy Gwaramadze looks into the diplomatic wrangling over the issue of the detained Georgian teenagers and their international implications. Also sending shockwaves, the demolished World War II memorial in Kutaisi kicks off not one, but two major controversies – in true Caucasus fashion. But those aren’t the only monoliths crumbling, as Georgia reconsiders its isolation-based policies towards the separatist regions. And while winter may be cold, intrigue surrounding Georgia is still red-hot with the strange tale of a Georgian cargo plane caught in Thailand with North Korean weapons.

All after the jump.

In this issue:

- The detention of Georgian Teens and the Underlying Reasons
- Demolition of World War II Memorial in Kutaisi
- Georgia Moderates Policies Towards the Separatist Territories
- Victor Bout’s Derisive Smile

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The Detention of the Georgian Teens and the Underlying Reasons
by Inge Snip, Remy Gwaramadze

Kiev and Warsaw | On the morning of November 4th, the South Ossetian Border Police captured and detained four young Georgian boys for the “illegal crossing of state borders,” and later adding the possession of “hand-grenades and explosives.” Being only between fourteen and seventeen years old, the imprisonment shocked many; not only Georgian officials made statements calling for the boys’ release, but also international actors got involved. On November 9th, the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia expressed its “profound concern” and demanded that in line with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the South Ossetian authorities needed to treat the young boys appropriately. In addition, the European Union added on November 13th that it “urged for a rapid release of all detained persons.” Moreover, the Council of Europe also expressed its deep concern on November 17th and called for the boys’ immediate release.

Nevertheless, on November 19th the South Ossetian government decided to put the detainees in pre-trial custody, since they were not only illegally crossing the border, but also for allegedly being in possession of illegal explosives, ‘legalizing’ the imprisonment of the teens. However, the true reason for the detention became clearer: prisoners-swapping. After a refusal to take part in a mediation on the issue, Merab Chigoev, South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity’s Deputy Envoy for post-conflict resolution issues, stated that three Ossetian citizens had been captured by Tbilisi and no information on them was available on their whereabouts and their situation. Thomas Hammarberg, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, said that indeed “there are people still detained on the both sides.”

Although this is a true fact, it does not diminishes the inappropriate detention of four underaged boys, not to be compared with adult detainees. Luckily, on December 2nd, the two youngest teenagers were released, after Georgia released five Ossetians; and on December 19 the other two were released, plus another teen that was already captured by the Ossetian side since July (only being fifteen years old).

However, after the exchange on December 2nd, when initially all the four teens would be freed, the South Ossetian authorities halted passing the two elder teens demanding more (up to forty) Ossetians kept by Georgian side to be set free. Some of them were detained long before the August War for severe criminal charges. According to Georgian authorities, all of them (detained before war) lived and operated in Georgia-controlled territories; in addition, three of detained Ossetians had been convicted and sentenced to lifetime imprisonment for terrorism; they were caught in 2005 after blowing up a car near police station in Gori, leaving three policeman dead and twenty-seven injured.

More interesting, however, is the story of another individual, who the South Ossetian authorities wanted to see released from Georgian custody: Nodar Dudayev (aka Marek Dudayev). Nodar was arrested in 2004 and convicted for twenty-three years in prison for blowing up railways near Mtskheta and several other crimes. Since Dudayev has been detained, his liberation has been demanded on a year-by-year base. According to Tbilisi officials, such exclusive efforts to bring him back could be connected to close relations between Eduard Kokoity and Erik Dudayev, the brother of Marek Dudayev.

During the civil war in 1991, Dudayev’s sister was killed and his mother was raped by Georgian forces, which might somewhat explain the South Ossetian authorities’ push for his release. On the other hand, Alan Parastayev, the former Minister of Interior and Supreme Judge of South Ossetia, admitted that he was forced to free Nodar Dudayev twice during his career. He also stated that Dudayev “was shooting” not only to Georgians but also Ossetians. “For a criminal, there is no nationality,” said Parastayev for RFE/RL’s Ekho Kavkaza radio [1].

Consequently, the abduction of the young Georgian teens can only be seen as just an element in Tskhinvali’s strange and corrupt system of patronage and control. In addition, such policies may have been conducted independently of Moscow, as the incident amounted to a severe hindrance to Russian diplomatic overtures during the high-profile NATO-Russia summit where new European defence strategy draft has been presented by the Russian side. In this light, an Russia-occupied Tskhinvali region is bad but an independent South Ossetia may be even worse. At the same time, Russia’s treatment of its Caucasus vassals has traditionally been to outsource control mostly to local warlords – in Chechnya it is Ramzan Kadyrov and in South Ossetia it is Kokoity – so Russia’s ability to rein in their proxies is normally somewhat subdued.

[1] See: http://realaudio.rferl.org/GR/2009/12/09/20091209-180000-GR-program.mp3

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Demolition of Warld War II Memorial in Kutaisi
by Remy Gwaramadze

Warsaw | Recently, Kutaisi became Georgia’s focus of controversy. The decision to move parliament sessions to Kutaisi had been endorsed earlier this year to help stimulate Georgia’s second largest city’s economy and prestige after years of neglect in favor of Tbilisi. But whether authorities like it or not, the whole project is now cursed with serious tragedy: a woman and her 8 year old daughter died on December 19th after being hit by a speeding block of concrete in their backyard during the demolition of the ‘Memorial of Fame’ where the new parliament building is to be established [1]. Part of the opposition gathered to begin protests anew (but failed), and the Russian spin machine did not stay far behind.

The great tragedy managed to obscure only for a short while the initial controversy about the monument itself, which commemorates the Georgians who fought their way through World War II battlefields, shoulder to shoulder with other nationalities of Soviet Union. Sensitive over Soviet times, Moscow was outraged with whole situation, hence, Russia charged that the blowing up of  the WWII Memorial was part of a broader campaign on ‘falsification of history.’ The Russian Ministry of Defence was keen to remind Georgia that theirs and Russia’s nation are connected by years of friendship. While this is definitely true in a cultural sphere, any military-related friendship ended with last year’s conflict, and I don’t think Russian Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov has to be reminded about that. In addition, Vladimir Putin echoed these claims, adding a heart-breaking proposal to recreate the monument in Moscow, ‘the capital of a once united state.’ One can see where his nostalgia lies, and it doesn’t seem to be in cultural friendship.

More important than the statement of Russia’s Prime Minister might be Zurab Nogaideli nodding at Putin’s words, shown on Russian state TV news during prime time. It’s hard to say if the former prime minister of Georgia and his Movement for Fair Georgia are going to form a pro-Russian force in Tbilisi, but it is for sure he is not going to be anti-Russian. Four visits in Moscow since September 2009 and a recent reception in Tskhinvali certainly prove Nogaideli’s courage. While he may have broken some ice, gotten technical issues done, and sent diplomatic signals, it almost certainly has costed him the high price of the “traitor” label and a certain political death in Georgia.

The problem of whole situation in Kutaisi is that it occurred in a country with a transitional status. Georgia is struggling to combine independent policy-making, political freedom and political stability. However, so far only the first part of that mix is justifiably fulfilled; post-Rose Revolution authorities act without Moscow’s opinion and often even at cross purposes of its Western allies, and it’s likely to remain this way. However, the facts of the case, the restoration and relocation of Memorial of Fame, and the responsibility of finding justice [2] seems to be drowning in a sea of pettiness, of a kind of freedom obsessed with Saakashvili’s alleged authoritarianism and megalomania. We have seen the birth of that freedom on April 9, 2009, when the opposition took to the streets and undisturbed remained there for months. Now what Georgia needs the most is that freedom to be filled with substance and constructive dialogue.

The task is to secure stability until political reshuffling for the 2013 presidential elections. Miheil Saakashvili has to pay more attention to internal public relations and reduce the incidence of ‘falling bricks,’ and even so, when the next brick fall off, it has to come down without such a rumble.

[1] Source: http://www.rferl.org/content/Georgia_Blows_Up_Soviet_War_Memorial_Two_People_Killed/1908415.html

[2] Source: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=21816

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Georgia Moderates Policies Towards Separatist Territories
by Remy Gwaramadze

Warsaw | At the end of the year, Georgia sent a powerful signal to the world. The draft paper with the working title “State Strategy towards Occupied Territories – Engagement through Cooperation” has been presented this week. The document not only discusses the discontinuation of isolation-based politics towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but also providing active measures to stimulate low-level cooperation. Areas of engagement include economic, education, healthcare and cultural projects, as well as through public diplomacy, people-to-people contacts including reopening of railway connection and bus traffic.According to the Georgian Minister of Reintegration, Temur Iakobashvili, who is behind the new strategy, a detailed work plan will be developed within next six months and presented before June 10, 2010 [1].

Such a move doesn’t seem like much of a surprise, as alternatives to ineffective isolation policies have been drawn up by Georgian opposition members and various commentator [2]. The switch in strategy is being made with the direct blessing of European Union and indirectly from Turkey. During the “Situation in Georgia” debate in the European Parliament on Dec. 15, European Commisioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner underlined the need of “strategic patience” and the “vanity” of isolationism. At the same time commitment for continuous support for Georgia’s territorial integrity has been expressed [3].

The other player, Turkey, can become a real deus ex machina, simply legalising and expanding their already active business presence in Abkhazia. It’s not a coincidence that on December 16th, the Ankara-based TEPAV think tank presented a report about Turkish engagement prospects in Abkhazia. “It is time for both the Turkish and Georgian governments to find practical ways to open up to Abkhazia and promote more active, more pro-engagement policy toward Abkhazia,” said Burcu Gültekin Punsmann, the report’s main contributor [4].

Another question that comes to mind is of a pragmatic nature. If the engagement policy is to work, it requires commitments from Sukhumi, Tskhinvali and Moscow. Why would they cooperate with the current Georgian government which is considered there to be aggressive? If they won’t, it would raise another paradox, at least for Abkhazia, which has expressed its openness to every kind of international relationship and should technically welcome Tbilisi’s move as de-facto recognition. Rebuffing Georgian overtures may rise some eyebrows in European capitals. “Why?” Brussels might ask, “Abkhazians told us they want to join Europe,  so we pushed Tbilisi to soften rhetorics and design changes. So why do reject them? Is it Russia their real course?”

My additional observation concerns the direct improvement of Georgia proper’s defense, as it eliminates a major casus belli for Russia – Tbilisi’s overall ‘aggresive’ policy towards ‘Russian citizens’ in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Defending and development of Georgia proper is unquestionably the main objective. Only after that is secured is genuine reconciliation possible.

[1] Source: http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=21830

[2] See: http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=4404

[3] See: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20091215+ITEM-016+DOC+XML+V0//EN

[4] Source: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkey-should-open-up-to-abkhazia-report-unveils-2009-12-16

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Victor Bout’s Derisive Smile
by Remy Gwaramadze

Warsaw | Try and get this. In a short period of time, the Kazakh East Wings Airlines sells an Il-76 cargo plane to Beibarys and another Kazakh Airlines. Then it’s sold to a Georgian airline. Air West Georgia’s formal base airport is Kopitnari/Kutaisi, Georgia, and a virtual address appears as Moscow/Vnukovo, Russia but registration data points to Babushara/Sukhumi, Abkhazia! Telephone number coincides with Abavia, an airline company also registered at Babushara. Before the August War, Abavia has been operating Moscow-Tbilisi charter connections. Base airport of Abavia, an airline registered in de facto independent Abkhazia, is Vaziani/Tbilisi, main base of the Georgian Air Force. Air West Georgia bounds the plane to an unspecified operator in Ukraine from where it flies to Asia. It carries loads an arms from North Korea and is busted a few weeks ago in Bangkok, Thailand with four Kazakhs and one Belorussian on board.

Portable missile systems, parts for ground-to-air missiles, grenades for grenade launchers and loads of regular rifle ammunition; in all about 35 tons of decent gear for militants. It’s clear that after another refill in Colombo, Sri Lanka, the cargo was supposed to reach recipients somewhere in the Middle East. Beside the inevitable speculation about it going to Afghanistan, it appears to be headed to Yemen concerning its ongoing civil war. Yemeni government troops allied with Saudi forces (and quietly backed by the West) squeeze Shiite rebels supported by Iran.

It is indeed an interesting, twisted story that raises two questions connected to Georgia, which alongside with Ukraine has been accused of illegal arms dealing activity. Major doubts concern Georgia’s crucial struggle against corruption. Transparency of major and middle-sized companies including current chaos in airlines has to be addressed. I also wonder whose airspace was used to fly quite a big machine unspotted from Ukraine to North Korea? Undoubtedly, there are many winks and nods going on in diplomatic circles about this incident, the subtext of which we may never fully learn. Victor Bout would be proud.