Evolutsia.Net

Caucasus Watch is a biweekly roundup focusing on the region’s major stories. The project is led by Analyst Remy Gwaramadze with support from the entire Evolutsia.Net team. The next issue of Caucasus Watch will be published on December 28th.

In this issue, Remy Gwaramadze examines the results of Abkhaz elections, coming to an interesting conclusion. Also, will the Zemo-Larsi border reopen? And who cares? Back in the news is the little piece of land known as Perevi, still occupied by Russian proxies. Outside of Georgia’s borders, the rhetoric is racheting up between perennial rivals Armenia and Azerbaijan. And finally, Managing Editor Michael Cecire considers the real reason why Georgian forces are deploying to Afghanistan in such large numbers. All after the jump.

In this issue:

- Abkhaz Elections
- Will the Zemo-Larsi Border Reopen?
- EUMM Comments on Perevi Occupation
- Intensification of Rhetoric Between Baku and Yerevan
- Georgia Planning to Boost Troop Numbers in Afghanistan

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Abkhaz elections
by Remy Gwaramadze

Warsaw | On Saturday, December 12th, Sergei Bagapsh was reelected President of the self-declared Republic of Abkhazia. He collected 59.4% of votes and secured the win in the first round. In second place was Bagapsh’s most prominent rival – and the erstwhile Kremlin choice from the controversial 2004 elections – Raul Khadzimba with 15.4% of votes. Next with 10.6% was Khadzinba’s political twin, Zaur Ardzinba (legend says he is distant relative to that Ardzinba). Businessman and rising star Beslan Butba gathered 7.9% and the mysterious outsider Vitaly Bganba finished with 1.5% of votes. The estimated turnout was pegged at 73.4% of Abkhaz passport holders.

Despite Tbilisi’s dismissal of the polls as an “immoral comedy” staged by the Kremlin, existing evidence seems to indicate that current elections in Abkhazia may have been relatively free and fair, all things considered. It is reported that possible fraud may have occurred in Gali, where more voting sheets than necessary had been allegedly provided, considering  that Gali’s large Georgian population (over 12 thousand of them were eligible to vote) was for the most part lukewarm towards the elections. Although the estimate of alleged fraud does not exceed 1-2%, Raul Khadzimba has threatened to pursue legal action; however, few expect his challenge to amount to much.

International observers were present; besides Russian and CIS monitors, small delegations also came from EU countries and the United States, although no official major Western organizations took part in a show of solidarity with the de jure authority in Tbilisi.

My observation from that election is the striking similarity of political proportions between factions in both Abkhazia and de facto Georgia. Both systems consist of a stable authority – poised against external foes and driving economic development - and a fractured opposition which also recognizes similar threats and national interests. And like their opposition analogues in Georgia, Raul Khadzinba and Zaur Ardzinba were openly allied, rallying together and appearing to share an identical electoral base. For his part, Beslan Butba refused to covene with them and ran his campaign his own way. And why? As in Georgia, personal ambitions and personal financial investments for power were the principal motivations for pursuing political office, not policy development.

Despite vacant promises of ill-defined ‘change’ from opposition factions in both in Abkhazia and Georgia, the voters in both polities are not given compelling rationale of substance as to why they should bring the opposition into power.

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Will the Zemo-Larsi Border Reopen?
by Remy Gwaramadze

Warsaw | During a media forum in Moscow, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev addressed possibility of Russo-Georgian reconciliation. He said that mutual differences should not interfere in relations between the peoples of Russia and Georgia. Medvedev stated that “the centuries-old friendship” between the Russian and Georgian peoples should not be sacrificed for politics. He expressed a hope that the visa regime between the two countries might be abolished in the future. He also said that there should be no obstacles to Georgian goods in the Russian market if they have been imported legally. Medvedev also said that he saw no major obstacles in reopening the Zemo-Larsi border crossing between Georgia and Russia and restoring air links.

Despite these surprisingly positive gestures, Medvedev also stressed again that Russia would not hold discussions with certain Georgian politicians, particularly the current President of Georgia. “Our paths separate and our assessment of [last year's] events are too different,” said the Russian leader.

Reaction from the Georgian side was positive, a stance it has consistently taken with regards to direct border connections with Russia. Russia imposed a blockade back in 2006 when the pro-Western agenda of Mikheil Saakashvili became clear. However, it’s no great secret that the first to benefit from Russo-Georgian “commercial reconciliation” is Armenia. Despite progressive Turkish-Armenia talks, passage through Greater Caucasus will likely remain the cheapest and most preferred route for Armenia’s export for the foreseeable future. Not to mention Armenia’s direct involvement in mediation process between Georgia and Russia.

Considering the timing of the discussions about the border reopening, it might be predicted that the connection might be fully reestablished with the spring blossoms, when the route itself becomes safe for use. Winter will see more talks and possible breakthroughs like this.

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EUMM Comments on Perevi Occupation
by Remy Gwaramadze

Warsaw | It has been a year since the apparently insignificant Perevi incident. Perevi is the last and the only piece of land that remains under Russian control despite the fact that it lies outside of the South Ossetian administrative boundary. The EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia issued a statement regarding thatsituation:

A year ago we were welcoming Russian Forces as they dismantled their checkpoint at Perevi after discussions with the EU, confirming by their actions our long held view that the checkpoint was indeed in Tbilisi administered territory. Unfortunately, very shortly afterwards Russian Forces returned and still remain in the original spot. This is a clear breach of the Six Point Agreement. I very much hope that the Russian authorities will feel able to meet their commitments.

But neither the EUMM nor media reports answers a basic question: why won’t the Russians pull out of Perevi? The answer: Perevi village is communication hub which links Georgia’s Imereti region with two gorges recognized as part of South Ossetia.

The real issue is that the area around these gorges contain a villages that have no direct connection with each other and with rest of South Ossetia. Especially during winter period, they’re cut off from Tskhinvali and can only be accessed via Georgian Perevi and further to Imereti. Prior to the August War, both gorges were under Georgian administration. This being the case, it’s very unlikely that Russia will pull out of Perevi barring heightened international pressure, which itself is unlikely.

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Intensification of Rhetoric between Baku and Yerevan
by Remy Gwaramadze

Warsaw | A serious intensification of rhetoric is occurring on the Baku-Yerevan line. Azerbaijani Minister of Defence, Saphar Abiev, came just short of openly threatening Armenia military action. “If negotiations won’t bring any results, a war with Armenia will be inevitable,” said Abiev. In the meantime, his spokesma Eldar Sabiroglu stated how unprepared and backward Armenia’s army is.

It’s just another round of increased tensions which started after the signing of the so-called Turkish-Armenian “protocols.” On November 20th, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev himself threatened a military solution in case talks between the two sides failed. Armenia, on the other hand, replied with assurances of their full military readiness and the possibility of recognizing Armenian-ruled Nagorno Karabakh Republic as an independent state.

Simultaneously, a new Russian strategy towards two warring Caucasus republics is slowly emerging. Everything indicates that Moscow is more than pleased to restore cordial relations with Azerbaijan over new gas deals proposals while the Baku broadcasts its displeasure over Turkey’s growing relations with Armenia. In the end, Russia may end up securing the death of the Nabucco pipeline project, which would be dependent on Azeri gas to function, but how would Armenia behave? Russia continues to be Armenia’s strategic ally, including in major military cooperation. A sudden significant boost in diplomatic and business ties with Armenia’s greatest foe might one day – and probably not without a turmoil – influence a pro-western turn in Armenia. Anti-Russian agitation, though still in its infancy, has been already reported by the Institute for War and Peace Reporting [http://www.iwpr.net/?p=crs&s=f&o=357768&apc_state=henpcrs].

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Georgia Planning to Boost Troop Numbers in Afghanistan
by Michael Cecire

Philadelphia | An additional complement of Georgian forces is poised join a company-sized contingent serving with ISAF forces in Afghanistan. By the time deployments are complete, Georgia will have nearly 1000 soldiers in Afghanistan, making it the highest per-capita contributor in the coalition. This decision was made despite clear existential threats to Georgia’s sovereignty, highlighted in the 2008 August War, and key European states’ staunch opposition to Georgian accession to NATO, despite regular rhetorical nods to Georgia’s progress. These things taken into consideration, it may seem that the Tbilisi decision to deploy Georgian forces to Afghanistan is a fool’s errand. The fact that Georgia’s best troops were in Iraq during Russia’s invasion in 2008 seems to highlight this fact.

However, Georgia is keen on creating conditions for a quid pro quo that will need to be fulfilled by the United States if not by the transatlantic alliance as a whole. Building on the strategic partnership signed between US and Georgian sides earlier this year, Georgia is hoping that its support to US-led foreign policy initiatives will lay the groundwork for a ‘special relationship’ all its own, akin to Washington’s good relations with the UAE and Singapore in the short term and, further afield, Israel and the United Kingdom. A plausible security guarantee from the United States is, in many ways, considered to be no less desirable than NATO membership, as the US is universally seen in Tbilisi’s foreign policy circles as the only wholly capable security guarantor, with the possible exception of nearby Turkey. Recent praise from a visiting American Air Force General and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is likely vindicating the deployment decision.

Also, in addition to pre-deployment training by US Marines, Georgia is counting on troop rotations in Afghanistan to provide valuable skills to Georgian forces for territorial defense. Unlike Iraq, which is predominantly flat and sandy, Afghanistan’s climatic diversity and mountainous terrain makes it a rough topographical cognate to Georgia, meaning that security and combat operations would provide Georgian troops valuable – if indirect and unofficial – lessons for battle. Interestingly, Afghanistan’s complex and hybridized insurgency may also be the focus for Georgian military planners who recognize that Georgia today could not muster the numbers to repel another full Russian assault. If Russia were to invade again, adopting many of the guerrilla and hybrid warfare tactics of Afghanistan’s muhajideen may be necessary.

Georgia wants to be the local indispensible ally for the United States and make Georgia’s sovereignty a key plank of US defense policy. Even though the short term gains from contributing troops are difficult to quantify, the possibility that this deployment could lead to long term security guarantees – which would be nothing short of a sea change for Georgia’s desirability as an investment destination – makes the deployment a relatively easy decision.