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Kiev, Ukraine

The beginning of the 21st century saw a wave of color-revolutions hit several former Soviet republics and regions, non-violently sweeping away dictatorial regimes in a number of independent countries. In both Ukraine and Georgia, where the respective ‘Orange’ and ‘Rose’ revolutions took place, the revolutions opened for those countries the real prospect of free and democratic environments. In addition, the international community applauded these nonviolent regime changes, stoking euphoria and genuine hope for their futures. It was an exhilaration which could be compared only to the collapse of the Soviet Union, which many analysts had believed ushered a new age of democracy. Although history did not completely bear this out, the color revolutions brought some of this hope back within reach.

However, in the 5 years or so since the events, both Ukraine and Georgia are still struggling to fully democratize and Ukraine sagging under the weight of the worst of the global economic crisis; Kiev experienced a crushing 18 percent drop in gross domestic product. In addition, many have raised concerns about Georgia’s recent democratic shortcomings, including from some of Georgia’s strongest traditional supporters. One of the main problems gripping both countries is an unbalanced political situation. Whereas in Ukraine there seems to be a political deadlock, making policy changes impossible, in Georgia power seems to be over-concentrated in the President and his allies. Concluding, it seems like both countries are struggling with different post-revolution issues. Therefore, this article will explore the differences, discuss the reasons for their struggle, and explain the underlying reasons for the differences.

Ukraine

“Razom nas Bahato! Nas ne podolaty!” could be heard in Independence Square in the heart of Kiev’s city center on November 22nd, 2004. “Together we are many! We cannot be defeated” is what the thousands of people were chanting, in hope creating a freer nation, after being disappointed by the fraudulent outcome of that October’s elections. The oligarchs had chosen Russia-backed Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych as their candidate to succeed Leonid Kuchma as President, and the fraudulent elections, mainly concentrated in Donetsk, compelled crowds to hit the streets and demand new elections and a new system. Eventually, they got them.

Unfortunately, one complicating factor became clear after those elections: the huge discrepancy in the country between pro-government and pro-orange factions. Despite the massive protests, perhaps as much as 44 percent of the electorate did not vote for the reformist Yushenko – who did get elected on December 26.  This section of society refused to see the popular uprising as legitimate, bifurcating the country’s political landscape into two large blocs, the Orange and non-Orange constituencies – strikingly polarized geographically with the East being pro- [Kuchma] government and the West pro-revolution.

Ukraine’s Orange Revolution was, in addition, one of the creations of a political nation, in which the political regime of the country needed to be reformed. Moreover, the Orange wave demanded a closer bond with Europe, towards a more open society, and criticized the government’s reflexively pro-Russian tendencies. However, this factor divided the country even more into nationalist and pro-Russian blocs, a electoral split that eventually enabled Kuchma’s erstwhile ally, Viktor Yanukovich, to return to politics again when voted into the parliament in 2006. Although Ukraine’s political freedoms did enhance tremendously after the revolution, with Freedom House marking huge gains, the country is seeing itself sliding into economic tragedy, and ironically, the political reforms might be said to be a major cause.

After the revolution, many political crises surfaced over Ukraine’s political landscape. In 2006, Yushenko made a pact with Yanukovich and made him Prime Minister, a move not being appreciated by the pro-Orange groups. However, in 2007, Yushenko realized he had lost a part of his power, as his policy agenda was in total paralysis since Yanukovich did not want to concede to any of Yushenko’s party proposals and vice-versa, as both were afraid the other would take the credit for success. After the dissolution of the Ukrainian parliament, new elections were held on September 2007 and another opposition party entered the field: oligarch Yuliya Tymoshenko’s political party gained tremendously and she was promoted Prime Minister. Unfortunately, history repeated itself and a complicated, tangled power struggle between Yushchenko, Yanukovich, and now-Prime Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko paralyzed policymaking, resulting in widespread public disgust with the Ukrainian political class as a whole.

Tymoshenko curries favor with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin

Consequently, severe deadlock has contributed to the immense economic crisis in Ukraine; the global economic crisis has hit Ukraine harder than perhaps any other Eastern European country. The Khrivna, Ukraine’s currency, has devaluated over 40 percent and Ukraine’s banking sector is in a major liquidity crisis. Tymoshenko wants to raise nationwide salaries by 16 percent to match metastasizing inflation, but Yushenko refuses to permit such populist, economic suicide. Yushenko wants to raise the pensions, but Timoshenko cannot approve for her own reasons. Yuchenko plays hardball with the Russians over the Ukrainian gas distribution network, and Tymoshenko plays nice; and so on. The politicians’ pride and paranoid power-conscious behavior have not been in the best interests of the country.

Concluding, the Orange Revolution did result in some form of political freedom; however, the post-Soviet culture in which the ‘winner takes it all’ is paralyzing the country and denying badly-needed progress. Arrogance and paranoia from all political actors are destabilizing the country, making it especially susceptible to economical shocks, whilst it is not capable of solving them.

Georgia

A similar revolution took place in Georgia one year earlier than Ukraine’s. After years of dissatisfaction with severe internal corruption, the so-called Rose Revolution occurred following rigged elections which took place on 2 November 2003. When longtime President Eduard Shevardnadze again declared victory, despite massive discontent, the Georgian population understood that these elections had to be fraudulent. Under a banner of change, carried by the Columbia-educated reformist Mikheil Saakashvili, thousands of people gathered on November 22^nd in front of the parliament to reverse the stolen election; after only one day, demonstrators and the opposition stormed the parliament and removed Shevardnadze without any bloodshed. Snap elections followed and Mikheil Saakashvili was elected to President in January 2005.

The Rose Revolution was the result of years of discontent with the political situation. Not only the frustration from years of corruption, in 1991 Transparency International pointed to Georgia as one of the most corrupt countries in the world, but also the fact Georgia suffered from enormous economic trauma with a president that was unwilling or unable to change the country’s direction. In the last years of Shevernadze’s presidency, he had lost control over almost all governmental institutions. This inevitably led to endemic mismanagement, corruption in every layer of society, and grave violations of human rights. These conditions fueled a society-wide demand for change of power, desiring a strong leader who would be able to get Georgia back on track. Passionate, articulate, Westernized Saakashvili seemed the right man for the times.

Unlike in Yushenko’s case one year later in Ukraine, Saakashvili won the elections with 97 percent of the vote, creating immense legitimacy for his political agenda. One of the first decisions Saakashvili made was to create more political power for the president, enabling him to make more vigorous policy changes. Though these measures rankled the opposition, they did yield benefits to Georgia’s economy, which began to blossom with the reforms. Moreover, in order to eradicate all forms of corruption, Saakashvili decided to remake the entire police system and replace all long-term officials. These kinds of measures were not popular with the former ruling elite – many of them holdovers from the days of the Soviet nomenklatura and siloviki – and as a consequence they started creating their own political parties in order to return to power.

On November 7, 2007, after weeks of demonstrations by opposition parties blocking Tbilisi’s main road, Saakashvili decided to end the blockade with force, which earned him condemnation from the international community and forced Saakashvili to resign, allegedly at the behest of the American government. However, Saakashvili again won the January 2008 elections with a minor majority. Though the elections were considered fraudulent by opposition parties and some civil society organizations, OSCE monitors and other international observers certified the elections and noted that violations were fairly minor. Although Saakashvili’s ruling party overwhelmingly won the parliamentary elections in May 2008 – enabling them to single-handedly pass constitutional changes – the opposition parties again called the elections fraudulent. Again, the international community found instances of irregularity not so influential to justify nullifying the results.

Georgian police crushed November 2007 demonstrations.

However, a spate of recent troubling developments should not be ignored. The problems range from issues in the media-world, with indications that the government is influencing and censoring more and more broadcasting networks; to the poorly-investigated or mostly ignored cases of assault against members of opposition parties, affiliates and their donors; and the allegedly corrupted judicial system, whose independence is considered highly questionable. As former Ombudsman Sozar Subari said: “During Sheverdnadze there were major violations of human rights, however, especially in his last years, they were not strictly coordinated; but now, the violations are structured and coordinated from inside the government.”

Although Mikheil Saakashvili’s policies have undoubtedly triggered an impressive number of positive changes within country, the current political ruling elite must understand that their actions over the last few years are teetering on the edge of democratic behavior, blurring with autocracy. Georgia is the freest state in the region, but it only takes one ill-conceived policy or power grab for all of the political – and economic – progress to unravel. If Georgia is to remain the ‘hope of the Caucasus,’ the ruling elite would be wise to consider the direction they’re taking.

Conclusion

Both revolutions have shown to be somewhat successful. However, both still struggle with post-revolution problems. Where Ukraine has been paralyzed due to a political system in which the sheer force of the opposition can easily balance – and in some cases outweigh – the Orange revolution’s leaders, Georgia is functionally ruled by one man and is always dangerously close to losing the sheen of its often-trumpeted democratic credentials. Yet, although Ukraine’s political freedom may be greater than Georgia’s, it is Georgia that suffers less from corruption and is experiencing major economic development, even in times of a global economic crisis.

One of the reasons for the partial failure of both revolutions can be found in the emphasis after the revolutions on the reform of the electoral system. Even successful electoral revolutions have shown insignificant or no democratic progress and can be seen ineffective at advancing overall democratization because they place too great an emphasis on elections themselves and do not address more fundamental issues in hybrid and authoritarian regimes.

In conclusion, neither Ukraine’s nor Georgia’s post-revolution period can be seen as a major success, which can be blamed on alternating forms of mismanagement. However, it is perhaps too early to judge these countries after only 5 years, since they both have seen measurable improvements compared to their pre-revolution periods. Nevertheless, it is time for both countries to acknowledge their problems. Ukraine must end its post-soviet ‘the winner takes all’ mentality, and take strong measures to reboot their economy; meanwhile Georgia must realize their political system is paralyzing the opposition, which has only had the effect of drowning moderate voices and driving much of the opposition into increasingly desperate rhetoric and radicalism, which neither benefits the ruling party nor Georgia as a whole.

The color revolutions were a starting point, and nothing more. While the seeds of reform were planted, democracy in both countries has a long way to go, and much of it will not be an easy climb.