by Michael Cecire

The S-300 saga continues with Iran, and begins with Abkhazia. And Azerbaijan. And Armenia. With news of competition for France’s Mistral, what’s with Russia and its weapons-politics?

Tbilisi | So, what’s the deal with these S-300s? Anyone following recent news that is 1) military related and 2) has anything to do with Russia has probably heard of the S-300, the bogeyman of anti-aircraft systems and the bane of NATO (and Israeli) air forces. The S-300 is an advanced Russian surface-to-air missile, considered by some the most advanced in the world, which is launched from the SA-10 battery.

Concerning the Caucasus, the S-300 barely registered on the local radar, as the biggest pitched battles over the deployment of this robust air-denial platform has been related to the subject of Iran, who has purchased – and expects delivery – of the S-300 system. Suffice to say that if that deployment were to go through, it would represent a major upgrade for the Islamic Republic’s military capabilities and a significant deterrent against possible US or Israeli action against their illicit nuclear program.

What is less sure, however, is if Moscow plans on actually going through with the sale, despite the agreement already having been inked. Though Russian leadership has claimed in the past that the delivery of the S-300 system would happen as planned, that kind of talk has since been toned down quite a bit. In fact, Russia has lately taken a harder line with Tehran, and is using its longstanding ties to the country as leverage.

But Russia’s balancing act is not simply an effort to preserve its partnership with Iran without inflaming Western sensibilities – although that does enter into matters to some extent – but also that Russia’s position of giver and taker of the power that the S-300 system represents preserves the impression of Russia’s geopolitical enormity.

“As long as there’s an Iran problem, the West will need Russia,” says Rajab Safarov, the head of the Center for Contemporary Iranian Studies in Moscow, in a recent Bloomberg article. “And Russia will feel like an important geopolitical player.” [1]

The S-300 issue is just one element, of course, of this overall strategy. Russia’s maintains an array of fulcra in the Iran situation, such as its overt technical assistance to the Iranian nuclear project. As divisive and bald-faced as this approach may seem, there’s no denying that Russia’s efforts have borne fruit.

After the August war, Russia essentially delivered an ultimatum to their Israeli counterparts, who had been supplying Georgia with weapons and training up to the wartime period. It was not long before these deals between Tbilisi and Tel Aviv were dropped and, in an especially painful moment of irony, Israel began selling to Russia the same reconnaissance drones that Russian fighters had been shooting down in Georgia only months before. [2]

Aside from the moral quandaries of Israel’s decision, Moscow has failed to reply to Israel’s overtures with positive movement. [3] Though the S-300 sale seems to have stalled for the moment, the Russian-assisted Bushehr nuclear reactor is set to begin full operations shortly, something that many experts see as a tipping point in the theocracy’s quest for nuclear weaponry. This includes former US ambassador to the UN John Bolton, who recently bemoaned the lack of international action against Iran’s unmitigated progress. [4]

Meanwhile, the United States’ ‘reset’ policy towards Russia, while having produced much on rhetoric, continues to show little in the way of real breakthrough in relations. To paraphrase many observers on the reset, Moscow’s expectations of the reset would not, and could not, be fulfilled unless Washington adjusted its foreign policy outlook to accommodate Russian neo-imperialist goals. So far, the outcome of the reset has been: the brokering of a minor nuclear arms reduction deal (which may or may not come to pass) that some say is a gift to the Russian military; a slight uptick in forcefulness by Russia towards Iran; and a general feeling of chumminess between Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and US President Barack Obama.

What the reset also has done, however, is continue to inflate Russia’s impression of self-importance. But make no mistake, Russia’s strategy in the Middle East is to maximize Western commitment without the process backfiring on them. In short, the Kremlin neither wants the West to lose, nor do they want to see the US win. Bogging Western attentions down in the Middle East may been seen as a way to prevent the West from challenging Russia’s focus on its near abroad.

But Russia has, so far, held off on its sale of S-300 systems to Iran. Why? For one, the message that it sends reeks of bad-faith. But then again, Syria already possesses the advanced weaponry. More likely, Russia has avoided selling Iran the weaponry because some believe that the system would render an Israeli attack virtually meaningless.

Then comes the news that Russia is now considering selling the S-300 to Azerbaijan, which some see as a balancing act to its upgraded military ties with Armenia. [5] It is no secret that Russia’s relations with Baku have improved considerably as of late, despite the fact that Azerbaijan and Armenia remain at odds over the Armenia-dominated ‘republic’ of Nagorno-Karabakh, another regional frozen conflict. Though Russia has long been considered the chief patron and ally to Armenia, Azerbaijan’s lucrative gas and oil deposits are crucial to Russia’s long-term pipeline chess game.

So it’s not much of a surprise that Russia would want to placate their counterparts in Azerbaijan after beefing up their presence in Armenia, which the Armenian leadership has billed as a guarantee of sorts against Azerbaijani aggression. Of course, few believe that Russia would risk its lucrative energy lifelines by actively assisting Armenia against Azerbaijan in the event of another outbreak of conflict, a sentiment echoed by EurasiaNet.

All of this may be true, but there could be another angle as well. The proposed sale of S-300s to Azerbaijan may portend the long-anticipated delivery of the systems to Iran. Why? Azerbaijan, incredibly, is considered a close (if somewhat quiet) ally to Israel, and there is a possibility that the Azeri government may be willing to give Israel limited access to the system. Russia undoubtedly knows that this is a possibility, but could be counting on it.

“Yes, we sold Iran the S-300,” they might respond to Israeli protests, “but we’ve also handed you a way to defeating them.” Israel did just that in late 2007 when it penetrated Syria’s S-300 monitored airspace to take out what many suspect to have been the beginnings of a Syrian nuclear program. [6] Greater technical understanding of the S-300 may be what the Israelis would need to defeat the system once again.

For Georgia, the proliferation of S-300 systems to these places does not mean a lot, at least not directly. Even Russia’s announcement of deploying the anti-aircraft batteries to Abkhazia, despite reports that it’s been there for about two years already, will do little to affect the local balance of power except to ward off potential NATO aircraft. [7]

What is clear, however, is that Russia’s casual vending and deployment of the S-300 underscores the Kremlin’s desire to create points of stress and leverage in key areas of the world. Consider that the S-300 is now deployed in Syria, Armenia, Abkhazia, and likely soon to be sent to Azerbaijan. Iran is technically due for delivery of the system. In a similar vein, Russia’s wrangling over the French helicopter carrier Mistral deal seems to have broken what once seemed to be a certain sale. Russia appears to be going back on its original exclusive bidder partnership with France and is issuing an open tender, which is sure to attract possible suitors from around the world, including Spain and the Netherlands, which have both expressed interest in the past.

The sticking point is on the transfer of technology, which France has refused to include in the sale as originally agreed. Unexpectedly, Russia changed its requirements mid-stream and demanded the inclusion of full systems, which put the program into deadlock. Russia is now upping the ante by inviting other bidders, demonstrating to France – and its labor unions – that it’s happy to go elsewhere for what it wants. [8] Russia has already sowed the seeds of distrust within NATO over the original Mistral agreement, and now sets to go even further by forcing France to compete with other NATO allies like Spain and the Netherlands; it will be a competition on whom can deliver the most advanced NATO technology to Russia for the cheapest price.

To be sure, the Russian strategy in every case seems to be maximizing its leverage against and between different countries – Iran and Israel, Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia and the conflict regions, Western and Eastern Europe, and the like. Though the conflicts vary in scope, size, and geopolitical weight, they all share the commonality of Russian strings somehow attached and, ominously, the threat or the promise of weapons sales.

Beware of Russians bearing gifts – of weapons.

Footnotes

[1] http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-19/russia-opening-iran-nuclear-plant-advances-goal-to-play-power-broker-role.html
[2] See: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7358761.stm
[3] See: http://evolutsia.net/?p=274
[4] http://www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2010/me_iran0785_08_16.asp
[5] http://www.eurasianet.org/node/61771
[6] http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/14/washington/14weapons.html
[7] http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22599
[8] http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4750808&c=budget;+policy&s=TOP

by Michael Cecire

A provocative proposal to resolve Georgia’s separatism conflict answers all the wrong questions. But is it onto something?

Borjomi | The recent anniversary of the 2008 August war has renewed, or refocused, interest by the global media in Georgia’s still-ongoing conflict with its separatist regions. While Georgia-related stories periodically rise to the top of the Western news cycle anyway, the war’s second anniversary has been a kind of invitation for commentators – some with ‘standing,’ others somewhat less so – to throw in their two cents on the conflict.

Not unpredictably, that included Russia, the invading force in the whole story, loudly and proudly sticking by its new, ‘sovereign’ allies. Russian President Dmitry Medvedev visited Abkhazia to reaffirm his support for the Moscow-aligned separatist regions.

“It was not a simple decision,” said Medvedev, according to AFP. “But time has shown that it was the right decision. The existence of the peoples of South Ossetia and Abkhazia was under threat.” [1]

Of course, time has shown no such thing. If anything, time has shown that Russia’s claims over “genocide” being perpetrated by Georgian forces turned out to be a carefully calibrated PR cocktail of propaganda and hyperbole. Whether or not it was a ‘right’ decision for Russia (from Russia’s perspective) is still a matter of debate, but certainly a more justifiable statement coming from the Russian leadership.

In a retrospective penned by Ghia Nodia in RFE/RL, [2] the Georgian political scientist casts some doubt on the assumption that Russia’s military victory has translated into broader geopolitical power. His case, though far from the final word, makes strong points.

However, the Russian leadership, obviously, does not share Nodia’s outlook. Somewhat ominously, Medvedev noted that certain Western partners had agreed that Russia’s 2008 response to Georgia was the right one. Medvedev added that “the 2008 brief Caucasus war between Georgia and Russia over South Ossetia failed to tarnish ties between Moscow and the rest of the world.”

Although US Senator John McCain and the Georgian government would almost certainly beg to differ, the fact remains that Russia continues to be in contravention of the ceasefire agreement negotiated by French President Nicholas Sarkozy. And though the West has at times employed stern language, the occasional firm resolution, and a few other assorted accusing glares, there is little to suggest that Medvedev’s inclinations are truly wrong. They may not be right, per se, but they do hint at an element of truth.

Perhaps the most prominent signal of Russian victory is the way the debate has subtlety but genuinely shifted since the war ended. In a piece for the Moscow Times, Dmitry Trenin, the director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, illustrates just what the war and its aftermath has done to Tbilisi’s international case for reunification. [3]

Probably unwittingly, Trenin concurs with Medvedev’s estimations and states that Georgia has been sidelined since its humiliation by Russia. “Georgia has not been forgotten,” qualifies Trenin. But it has been “bracketed.”

A function of this development has been the hardening of the status quo – Georgia’s separatist regions begin to seem less and less like dislocated pieces of Georgia, but as unique entities. Part of this is just a result of being outside of Tbilisi’s control for so long, but there’s no question that Russia’s occupation and ‘recognition’ in 2008 has thoroughly contributed to this sense.

It is in this context that Trenin proposes a plan that is fairly radical in its moderation – a middle solution to the conflict that could provide an opening for reconciliation between Georgia and Russia and, conceivably, open the door to Georgia’s continued integration with the West. Rather than spending time backing either the Russian or Georgian version of events – or their respective interpretations of justice – Trenin looks to split the difference and chart out a solution that could be worthwhile to both sides.

His proposal is to trade land for peace in Abkhazia (a haunting turn of phrase that seems to allude to the unending Arab-Israeli conflict), with Gali returning to Tbilisi in exchange for recognition and diplomatic relations. South Ossetia, which he reasonably does not see as being a particularly strong candidate for actual statehood, would be given a pseudo-independent status like Andorra, a tiny principality the straddles the border of Spain and France. South Ossetia could retain “the formal trappings of independence,” as he says, but would have legal ties to both Russia and Georgia.

If this model seems familiar to you, that’s because it’s pretty much the situation in South Ossetia right now, except that Georgia has no role. Neither the authorities in Tskhinvali nor the Kremlin has been particularly worried about doing much to conceal Russia’s de facto annexation of the region beyond making a few flags and signing some documents. Except this time, Georgia is involved.

The ideas are all interesting and, to Trenin’s credit, a far more appealing option than the status quo. Still, many Georgians are understandably unlikely to be satisfied with anything less than the full reunification of Georgia, despite Trenin’s apparent attempt to take Georgian grievances into account.

And yet, while Trenin’s specific proposal is a nuanced one, it fundamentally rejects the notion that Georgia’s sovereignty is inviolable. More distressing is that the proposal moves the goalposts and no longer sees the separatist regions as zones of conflict in Georgia, but as Russian protectorates. Trenin is by no means the first, but he is by no means the last, either.

The premise is also based on the interesting, but wholly naïve, assumption that Russia’s only interest in the region is the preservation of ethnic minorities’ rights. Besides Russia’s woeful record of minority rights within its own borders, Russia has made it clear from its Georgia policy that regional domination – and not ethnic rights – is its primary mission in the Caucasus. It is for this very reason that Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are contingent on their fealty and dependence on Moscow. Were Abkhazia to suddenly earn substantial recognition around the world, and be given an invitation to join NATO, for example, is there any chance that Russia would shrug and let it happen? The same is no less true for Georgia. Or, as James Traub recently wrote in an article for Foreign Policy magazine, “If Russia’s goal were simply to liberate the Abkhaz and Ossetian people from the Georgian yoke, some kind of solution involving substantial autonomy might well be found.”

“But if Russia’s goal is to bring Georgia to heel, then it will not withdraw its military presence in the region save under concerted pressure from the West.” [4]

The solution to the separatist regions will not be solved through military means alone, and Georgia may have even reached a point where reunification with both, or even one, of the regions is either impossible or highly unlikely in the foreseeable future barring some kind of geopolitical sea change. But Georgia’s changing relationship with Sukhumi and Tskhinvali must happen on its own terms, and not based on the prodding of elites who buy heavily into the Kremlin narrative.

But Tbilisi is rapidly running out of time. Though the world does not seem eager to open embassies in Sukhumi, the longer the current situation remains, the longer it calcifies into the sediment of ‘status quo,’ from which it may be impossible to wrest without great loss and sorrow. Though Trenin’s proposal may have been wrought upon assumptions that are bad, it doesn’t mean the proposals themselves necessarily are. What if Georgia were to call his bluff? What if Georgia took the extraordinary step of radical diplomacy to stem the tide of Russian expansion?

Footnotes

[1] http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=medvedev-makes-first-visit-to-abkhazia-since-georgia-war-2010-08-08
[2] See: http://evolutsia.net/?p=1634
[3] http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/how-to-make-peace-with-georgia/411927.html
[4] http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/08/13/the_georgia_syndrome?page=0,0

by Michael Cecire

On the second anniversary of the August 2008 war, is Georgia doing relatively well, or is it hopelessly besieged and in great peril? Well, both.

Tbilisi | It has been two years since the August 2008 war between Russia and Georgia. Of course, there is something disingenuous about citing August 8 as the anniversary. Most experts now agree, even if they disagree on the final orientation of the region, that the war was hardly a product of 2008 alone, but had roots that went back much further. Indeed, Russia’s involvement in the Caucasus has been several centuries in the making, and the more enterprising scholar might realistically trace the roots of the August 2008 war to Czarist Russian expansion in the 18th and 19th centuries. It’s the kind of stuff that PhD dissertations of made of.

Either way, the war has happened. Though the future of the South Caucasus remains an open question, the furious debates, recriminations, and finger-pointing that followed the August 2008 war has mostly cooled. And quietly, though not unabashedly, pro-Georgia supporters have drifted into two camps over the war’s continuing legacy.

On one hand, you have the words of US Senator John McCain, who recently declared in a Washington Post Op-ed that much has changed since 2008, but none “for the better.”

“Russia not only occupies Georgian territory but is building military bases there, denying access to humanitarian missions and monitors, permitting the ethnic cleansing of Georgians in South Ossetia, and working to fortify the administrative boundary lines of the breakaway regions into hardened borders,” noted McCain drearily. “More than 100,000 ethnic Georgians who fled Russia’s invasion remain in a situation of effective displacement, according to U.N. estimates. Even now, Russia is in violation of the cease-fire commitments it made with French President Nicolas Sarkozy.” [1]

McCain goes on to call for the US and the West to ensure that Georgia has the equipment and diplomatic support that it needs to ensure its independence and to fend off Russian revanchism. This is an opinion that has been echoed, in varying degrees of forcefulness, by other US members of Congress as well as administration officials. For instance, it was US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who broke ground only a few weeks ago by slamming Russia for its “occupation” – a monumental example of candor and tough talk from the White House’s representative to the world.

On the other hand, Georgian political scientist Ghia Nodia, in a column for the Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty website, downplays the significance of the war and its long-term geopolitical effects.
“The main thing is that Russia didn’t manage to hang President Mikheil Saakashvili ‘by the balls’ (according to Western media, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin expressed this very desire), neither in the literal sense, nor even figuratively,” explains Nodia. “The war did not produce chaos in Georgia or provoke a serious political or economic crisis.” [2]

So who’s got it right?

Although Georgia has been through bouts of economic, political, and diplomatic uncertainty since the war, Nodia is indeed correct that Georgia’s current position is a relatively happy one considering the panic that accompanied the war. In short, if many knew then that Georgia would be where it is now, Georgians would have likely been extremely relieved. In many ways, despite the frustrations of Georgia’s hot & cold war with Moscow and its proxies, the current situation is about as much of a best case scenario for Georgia as one could have hoped for.

That’s not to say that all is well. Ghia Nodia’s analysis, ever insightful, does not detract from McCain’s exhortations. If things in Georgia are going better than one could have hoped two years ago, it’s as much a function of dismal expectations as good fortune for the besieged Caucasian state. By any honest assessment, Georgia’s relatively non-atrocious situation is one that can certainly be built upon and has vast room for improvement.

Nodia writes with an air of hopefulness and sobriety over the war’s long-term, structural impact on global affairs as well as Georgia’s immediate situation. From this perspective, the war only underlined already existing realities – Abkhazia and South Ossetia were functionally apart from Tbilisi, Russia and Georgia being at odds, and Russia’s bid to rebuild its lost empire. For a political scientist, the rich symbolism does little to alter the realities of the world. At worst, Georgia lost a few territories – most of which it didn’t actually have before the war anyway – and took a blow to its pride, not to mention the human and material cost of the war. At best, the war exposed Russia’s bald intentions in the region and failed to turn Georgia into a Kremlin vassal or failed state.

McCain, for his part, speaks of the war’s symbolism exactly as one can expect a statesman and old warhorse to do: as significant, as meaningful, and as a rallying cry. McCain has been a candid and unapologetic critic of the Kremlin for quite some time, including the period in which Putin was once seen as Russia’s best chance for democracy (yes, you read that right) and some American conservatives openly pondered giving Russia a ‘free hand’ in Chechnya (read: near genocide) in return for assistance with the oft-renamed Global War on Terror. In that sense, McCain is hardly looking at the war and its effects through a prism of naiveté.

Instead, even though Georgia’s situation could be much worse, the former presidential candidate and war hero is noting that things are already pretty bad. Even if Georgia’s war with Russia was not a turning point in concrete terms, its symbolism of Russia’s aggressive revanchism was pivotal in showing what the world was contending with in Putin’s new empire.

The legacy of the August 2008 war is no one thing, as the verifiable and convincing words from both Nodia and McCain ably demonstrate. Georgia is both doing better than most dared to hope as well as still mired in the tempest of Moscow’s imperial ambitions, 20 percent of its territory chewed off and with tens of thousands displaced.

What is important to remember is that one can be both thankful that Georgia has not suffered a worse fate (as McCain probably does) while also appreciating the magnitude of the challenges that Georgia has and continues to confront (as Nodia probably does). It’s not a choice between hopefulness or adversity, optimism or difficulty, resolve and challenge – one can often be the sire of the other. Georgia can take account of the looming obstacles while remaining mindful of what has already been accomplished, and use both as a foundation for the next chapter in this mountainous country’s future.

Footnotes

[1] http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/06/AR2010080605368.html
[2] http://www.rferl.org/content/The_Little_War_That_Actually_Didnt_Shake_The_World/2120838.html

by Michael Cecire

Recent spikes in violence in the restive Gali region of Abkhazia could portend a coming shift in the breakaway republic’s political direction.

Tbilisi | In early June, a crescendo of violence seemed to wash over the heavily ethnic-Georgian region of Gali in Abkhazia, the separatist republic to the northwest of de facto Georgia. After various reports that cited house burnings, shoot-outs, and killings, the European Monitoring Mission (EUMM) issued a statement on June 7 calling for calm.

“As EUMM has no direct access to the area, it cannot ascertain the exact nature or dynamics of these incidents. Whilst local investigations are underway though, it is very important that all sides refrain from comments that could further increase tension in the area. Restraint is needed to ensure that the confidence of the local population is not harmed and stability not endangered.” [1]

While it seemed that the fighting began to wane by the end of June, reports began to reemerge in July of renewed hostilities. Theories over the origins of the intermittent violence have been varied. Sergey Bagapsh, the de facto president of the separatist republic, was quick to accuse Georgians for fomenting the conflict.

“It should be stated clearly that if the Georgian side does not stop subversive acts, we will have to take adequate measures,” he said on June 4. “The organizers of terrorist acts should understand that local destabilization may cause the aggravation of already uneasy situation in the region where the refugees have returned.” This was a not-so-veiled reference to meddling by Tbilisi in Gali, which is heavily populated with ethnic Georgians. [2]

Besides interference by Georgian operatives, another oft-cited rationale for the violence has been disagreements between Russian forces and Abkhazian militias. According to the Georgian media, fighting broke out between the ostensible allies over the distribution of money seized (sometimes reported as ‘taxes’) from Georgian villages; this disagreement led to the killing of an Abkhazian customs officer and an Abkhazian village headman, Dimitry Katsia. Reportedly, Katsia’s death prompted a reprisal by Sukhumi authorities to arrest, torture, and kill Gogita Anjaparidze, an ethnic Georgian whom many say was taken to corroborate the story of Georgian involvement. [3]

An expert with direct access and experience in Abkhazia spoke to Evolutsia.Net on a condition of anonymity and verified that the violence had indeed been between Abkhazians and Russians, but not necessarily over the issue of money or spoils. Instead, the fighting was the consummation of months of growing antipathy between two sides that have become increasingly wary—and, by some accounts, estranged—from one another since Georgia lost its war with Russia in August 2008 and Abkhazia (and South Ossetia) were subsequently recognized as independent states later that autumn.

This development should not be seen as a great surprise. Russian backing turned out to be something of a mixed bag for Sukhumi, which has sometimes chafed at Russia’s interpretation of Abkhazian ‘independence,’ something that has functionally meant only deeper dependence on and integration with Russia since the war. This increasing trend has been extensively documented by both the Brussels-based International Crisis Group [4] as well as an invigorated the Abkhazian opposition, which framed the previous presidential elections over Moscow’s overeager embrace of Abkhazia. [5]

While most Abkhazians, and certainly those in the political class, understand that Russia’s assistance was and remains crucial to their separation from Georgia, there is also a growing feeling that their arrangement with the Kremlin may have a Faustian feel to it.

“We had a poor understanding of what was going on that day, August 26, when Russia recognized us,” said Inal Khashig, an Abkhazian journalist cited in a 2009 report by RFE/RL.

“It was an emotional wave. Only later did we figure out that we were not getting what we wanted. Earlier, even though nobody recognized us, we were truly independent. Now, after recognizing Abkhazia, Russia is swallowing us. This is happening economically, politically, militarily, and socially. Every day we are becoming more and more dependent.” [6]

This realization by an Abkhazian journalist, over a year ago, was almost certainly elevated in the run-up to Abkhazia’s December elections, as the opposition played heavily on the theme of Bagapsh’s concessions to the Russians. And with Russians in control of their budget, their borders, and primary transportation links, there is sure to be a substantial well of resentment among average Abkhazians about the veracity of their supposed ‘independence’ and the impunity by which Russians have assumed the commanding heights in Abkhazian economic and political affairs.

Such a sense of resentment, combined with more prosaic disagreements—such as dividing money—can be a recipe for combustion. Heated attitudes and disagreements may have led to the violence, which may be headed towards something more significant unless the Abkhazian, or Russian, authorities can keep things under better control. Without a doubt, they will be keen to use Georgia as a bogeyman for scapegoating, but this will do little except perhaps deflect harder questions for a short time.

It’s no great secret that the regions north of Abkhazia and Georgia, in the North Caucasus, have gone from open war in Chechnya to a blood-won fragile calm and back again into a low-level state of guerilla war by Islamists, nationalists, and village clans. The various groups have fought against each other and, increasingly, against Russian forces and their badly corrupt proxies. It is not inconceivable that should violence in Abkhazia continue to escalate, particularly when the sheen of ‘victory’ over Georgia has worn off, that Russia will become the target of their nationalist passions. Of course, this is hardly a foregone conclusion, but if Russia’s management style in its Caucasus territories is any indication, a real danger does exist. In the North Caucasus, Russia has usually ignored problems until the region became engulfed in violence, prompting intervention by Russian federal forces, who have generally had an extremely poor track-record at counterinsurgency. Instead of winning over the population, Russian tactics in the North Caucasus have often been brutal and further fanned flames of resentment.

Georgia may see this possibility as an opportunity, but the situation is not very clear cut, black and white, Georgia or Russia. If Abkhazia were to arrive to a point where they seek to distance themselves from Russia, it is unlikely that it would be because of a newfound fraternity with Georgia, but rather because of still-burning fires of nationalism against Russia. At that point, Georgia’s position towards Abkhazia will have to be sufficiently nuanced and flexible for them to even entertain the notion of closer relations, much less any talk of reunification.

Instead, Georgia would be better off simply aiming for pulling Abkhazia out of Russia’s orbit and place less of a priority on political integration. That’s not to say that reunification will be forever impossible, but it’s not a first step. In many ways, a genuinely independent and liberal Abkhazia may be the best that Georgia can hope for in the short to medium term, with the chance at reunification only coming later, once the wounds of war have long healed.

Footnotes

[1] http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22399
[2] http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22392
[3] http://www.messenger.com.ge/issues/2122_june_8_2010/2122_mzia.html
[4] See: http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/202_abkhazia___deepening_dependence.ashx (PDF)
[5] See: http://www.iwpr.net/report-news/abkhaz-opposition-fear-growing-russian-influence
[6] http://www.rferl.org/content/Abkhazia_The_Perils_Of_Independence/1758008.html

by Inge Snip and Michael Cecire

Austrian authorities report that organized crime has been investing in certain Georgian opposition parties. It’s high time for the reasonable opposition to finally and fully cut ties to radical factions if they hope to progress.

Tbilisi | The Wall Street Journal, Frankfurter Rundschau, and Civil.ge have all recently reported apparent links between Eastern European organized criminal networks and elements of the Georgian opposition, although the names of the specific parties has not been revealed.

Apparently, organized crime invested over a half-million dollars into the spring 2009 protests—during which rumors persisted of protestors being paid 50 lari per day to camp in the street—in the hope that Saakashvili could be overthrown through another revolution. The alleged crime organization is based in Georgia and funds itself through a combination of theft, blackmail, and money laundering operations primarily in Western Europe.

Although no Georgia-based names are being revealed, nor the method on how the money was used, the verification of such links by a Western European agency is quite compelling. However, according to Georgian foreign minister Grigol Vashadze, the Georgian authorities were already aware of such a scheme.

“As far as links between Vienna-based some criminals and so called opposition, marginal opposition is concerned, we’ve been speaking about it for a long time already and there is nothing surprising in [this report],” he said, speaking to the 66-page report by the Austrian Federal Criminal Police Office.

And indeed, it can hardly be called surprising that opposition parties are being sponsored by money that is not completely pure, as Georgia has had more than its share of corruption and mafia connections in its recent history. However, it might be the first time such an extensive foreign investigation is pending. In addition, according to Civil.ge, another interesting fact is that high-level government officials were being contacted by the criminal group.

“According to the same report the network tried to use assistance from ‘senior Interior Ministry officials’ as well in reaching its goal,” says the article. “Vienna-based members of the network were also in contact with Georgian embassy and consulate employees, receiving information from them, according to the report.” [1]

It is worth noting that Vienna’s centrality to the report is not insignificant. Aside from being a ‘Western’ European city and in an EU-member country, Vienna has been routinely linked by the Georgian government to frequent radical opposition meetings with pro-Moscow Georgian oligarchs and criminal bosses which, unsurprisingly, have tended to overlap. [2]This pattern was alluded to in the Austrian security services’ report, which also revealed links to the Moscow-based Igor Giorgadze.

“The report says the group’s allies include Igor Giorgadze, a former Georgian minister for state security who left Georgia for Moscow in 1995, shortly after an assassination attempt on former Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze,” reported the Wall Street Journal. [3]

Although it is not particularly surprising that Giorgadze is involved in criminal activities or that he wants Saakashvili removed—he has been fairly vocal on that—the sober assessment by a respected Western security service in a neutral country, instead of accusations from Georgian officials understandably qualified by possible political motivations, is especially crucial for the allegation’s credibility.

In addition, the way the crime network tried to overthrow Saakashvili is also worth further examination. Apparently, the group had taken a blueprint from the November 2007 protests [4] that turned violent and came to the conclusion that they could do a better job with extra money. The report also mentions that the group “use corruption and intimidation to exert influence over the Georgian economy and politics in order to shield itself from the threat of criminal prosecution.”

Giorgadze then organized demonstrations, according to the report, in an attempt to provoke police violence as a prelude to an uprising that would topple Saakashvili’s government. However, Saakashvili was famously unprovoked and the opposition protests fizzled out after a few months. So far, more than 50 people have been arrested in several European countries for being a member of this Georgian Mafia. However, the identified boss of the Georgian-organized crime network in Europe, Lasha Shushanashvili, has evaded arrest in Greece.

Overall, the report is significant on many levels. Besides somewhat validating previous claims made both officially and unofficially by the Georgian government and its allies about the 2009 protestors, the report’s contents and timing after Gigi Ugulava’s lopsided May election victory further erodes the opposition’s credibility as a coherent force and truly representative of more than marginal interests among key members of Georgia’s disaffected elite.

Significantly, though the report doesn’t explicitly name names, we can get an idea of who is being implicated. In addition to Giorgadze, who has been linked to ex-Speaker Nino Burjanadze in the past, there is also Burjanadze’s husband Badri Bitsadze, Russian oligarch Shalva Breus, former defense minister Irakli Okruashvili (who has recently met with ex-Prime Minister Zurab Noghaideli for cooperative meetings [5]), and a number of others, all of whom have been tied to both the criminal underworld and the ‘Vienna society.’ This Vienna society is likely anchored by ex-MP Levan Pirveli, a resident of Vienna after leaving Georgia following the 2003 Rose Revolution, who organized a conference of like-minded people in 2009 ahead of the April protests.

The 2009 conference, presumably one of several, brought together a number of such people together to coordinate their activities. Though hardly a smoking gun, the connection between the Austrian police report and the 2009 conference shortly before the protests is almost certainly not a coincidence. Entitled “Perspectives for Georgia’s Future,” the Vienna conference saw dozens of expatriate Georgians, representatives of the openly fascist Austrian Freedom Party, and a delegation from Russia. And although Pirveli has made no secret of his disdain for Giorgadze in the past, it does not preclude cooperation between the many overlapping members of the two men’s circles.

“Also in attendance at the Vienna meeting were prominent Georgian publisher Malkhaz Gulashvili, Industrialists party leader Zurab Tkemaladze, Liberty party head Konstantine Gamsakhurdia, and Vladimir Khomeriki, head of the Moscow-based Russian-Georgian Unity Foundation,” notes an RFE/RL article. [6] Gulashvili was a responsible party in the May Orthodox violence, who fled to Tskhinvali after learning of plans for his arrest. [7]

All of this suggests that ties between elements of the opposition (but not all), organized crime, and Moscow-based interlocutors—mostly oligarchs, officials, criminals, and combinations thereof that are beholden to the Putin regime—are both real and are actively working to undermine Georgia’s independence. Of course, this does not necessarily absolve the Government of any wrongdoing in which it has been also involved, but it does indicate that the opposition’s connection to Moscow and their shadier proxies has fermenting for some time. Few should be under the illusion that Noghaideli’s suddenly-publicized trips to Moscow in early 2010 or Burjanadze’s own pilgrimage to the Kremlin this year were the sudden beginnings of the relationship. Just from a logistical standpoint, both politicians would have had to have made significant contact and held negotiations with Russian parties for some time before their visits.

More ominously, it’s certainly possible, and particularly likely in the case of Nino Burjanadze, that there was some element of contact all along. Burjanadze deserves special scrutiny as her family is known to be a part of the old Soviet nomenklatura. A true survivor, Burjanadze has changed with the times, from being a Shevardnadze-era apparatchik to an opposition movement leader to Saakashvili crony and back again to the opposition. While her latest shift might be in the process of backfiring, one could be forgiven for thinking that the political future for Burjanadze and her movement are not necessarily reflective of anything other than her own strictly parochial interests.

On one hand, the revelations underscore both the dangerous inclinations of some of the opposition as well as highlighting the reason why Georgia needs an active and loyal opposition. Though the information will be sure to fuel the perception, and ruling party rhetoric, that the opposition is entirely a pro-Kremlin fifth column, Georgian voters are in greater need of credible options more than ever. How can indictments against Saakashvili from the mouths of those who collude with Putin and mafia be taken seriously as an alternative?

Certainly, the United National Movement, like any political party, demands monitoring and constructive criticism. But if the opposition is sullied by even worse associations, then the UNM realistically commands the moral high ground, however alarming that may sound. Hoping to achieve a major electoral coup, unity has been prioritized among the opposition factions, with little to no consideration for the things that separate them. However, if the opposition is to find any kind of success in the near to medium future, the ‘credible’ voices must fully and loudly divorce themselves from the radicals and cultivate a smart policy-oriented, patriotic platform. To repeat an old maxim, quality is much more important than quantity.

Footnotes

[1] http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22449
[2] See: http://www.rferl.org/content/Burjanadzes_Husband_Becomes_Focus_Of_Georgian_Political_Intrigue/1563251.html
[3] http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704699604575343000053285786.html?mod=googlenews_wsj
[4] However, there is no stated evidence of any link between the 2007 protests and this group.
[5] http://www.finchannel.com/Main_News/Geo/64556_Ex-PM_Nogaideli_Meets_Ex-Defense_Minister_Okruashvili/
[6] http://www.rferl.org/content/Burjanadzes_Husband_Becomes_Focus_Of_Georgian_Political_Intrigue/1563251.html
[7] See: http://evolutsia.net/?p=1542

by Remy Gwaramadze

Poland’s election brought victory to Civic Platform candidate Bronislaw Komorowski, who is not likely to support Tbilisi like his predecessor Lech Kaczynski. But there may be a silver lining.

Warsaw | The July 4 runoff presidential elections in Poland yielded 53 percent for Bronislaw Komorowski to be the next president. Jaroslaw Kaczynski, the twin brother of the late president and himself the former prime minister, came in not far behind with about 47 percent. Turnout was a little over 55 percent.

After 3 years, Poland has gotten back on track towards a virtual power monopoly by the Komorowski’s Civic Platform (Polish: Platforma Obywatelska, PO) leading the country in coalition with the small Polish People’s Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, PSL). Along with Komorowski’s close ally in Prime Minister Donald Tusk, PO will be dogged by a surprisingly resilient opposition that quite nearly derailed the technocratic party’s once-invulnerable takeover of Poland’s government. With a relatively thin 6-point margin, PO can’t be feeling very complacent about their victory and will likely see Kaczynski’s Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS) nipping at their heels right up to the 2011 parliamentary elections.

Similar challenges in 2006-2007 eventually sundered the Kaczynski-Kaczynski duo and have led to endless political struggles between PO and PiS, despite the fact that both of these parties could be considered on the center-right, often making distinctions unclear. However, in foreign policy, one major area of disagreement was over Lech Kaczynski’s robust support and trip to Georgia in August 2008.

Komorowski’s victory is being received with relief in Western European capitals as he stands in line with Sarkozy and Merkel’s pragmatic pan-European vision, starting with the European Union itself and extending to a sense of restraint towards non-Union states to the East.  Jaroslaw Kaczynski, who is both the biological as well as a political twin of his dead brother, would like to follow his brother view of a healthy Euroskepticism and active engagement with non-EU post-Soviet states, particularly with eager Georgia.

With the PO’s sweep complete, Georgia’s position on Warsaw’s radar is likely to drop dramatically even if Poland’s official position does not change. This will leave Georgia further de facto isolated and made to deal with its aggressive northern neighbor alone. Back in November 2008, Komorowski was quick to blame Georgia for a still-ambiguous shooting incident that occurred along the Akhalgori border.

Prior to the presidential runoff vote, Komorowski said in the interview for Polish Newsweek that “Poland relies on the independence of the Caucasian countries and supports the territorial integrity of Georgia.”

“But we should be aware that Georgian politicians are responsible for their own situation,” he noted. In the same interview, he went on to criticize US policy in the region, insisting that it was a “problem,” although he did not elaborate.[1]

Obviously, another player praising the Polish choice is Russia, which is happy to see an outspoken critic and Georgia advocate lose out. This is particularly true considering that Georgia remains the last enduring ‘color revolution’ government; recent reversals in Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, not to mention growing ties between Moscow and Baku and Ankara, have left Georgia a standalone redoubt in an increasingly Russia-oriented region.

But despite the initial appearances, this power shift doesn’t mean that much for Georgia. Before the tragic plane crash, Lech Kaczynski had slim chances to be reelected to a second term in elections scheduled for autumn, which means that Georgia have had to face this eventuality anyway and it was just a matter of time.

Second, Georgia was not anywhere close to be considered a pivotal issue in the presidential contest, even from Jaroslaw Kaczynski. Poland, culturally drifting towards Western Europe, is in the process of adopting the same attitudes towards the less successful members of the post-Soviet community. One might describe this attitude as we-don’t-care politics.

Finally, the incoming wave of ultra-pragmatic Polish foreign policies may trigger, or rather accelerate, a similar notion in Georgia that could come to regard NATO and Euro-Atlantic integration as icing on the cake rather than an end by itself. Tbilisi may be better off looking at its foreign affairs strategy in a more hard-nosed light and concentrate on a pragmatic diversification of its diplomatic portfolio to hedge against the increasingly mercurial West.

Footnotes

[1] http://www.newsweek.pl/artykuly/sekcje/polska/bede-prezydentem-calej-polski–komorowski-dla-newsweeka,61264,7

Michael Cecire contributed to this article.

by Inge Snip

After Hillary Clinton visited Georgia, Nino Burjanadze, seizing the moment, takes the opportunity to make a complete fool of herself. Again.

Tbilisi | On July 5, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Georgia and met with a number of groups, including representatives of civil society, the opposition, and women leaders as well as government officials, lawmakers, and President Mikheil Saakashvili.  Nino Burjanadze, an erstwhile ally of Saakashvili and former parliament speaker who is now a fierce critic of the government, was not included in the opposition meeting (invitees were Giorgi Targamadze of the Christian Democrats and Irakli Alasania of Our Georgia – Free Democrats) but was instead invited to a ‘townhall’ meeting with emerging Georgian women leaders.

Deeply hurt, Burjanadze decided to claim that the invitees were governmental puppets and refused the invitation – sending a representative to the meeting instead. “Those figures, which are comfortable opposition for the authorities, have been selected for this meeting; those opposition [representatives] who do not create problems to the authorities,” she said. [1]

Burjanadze’s tactic of implying that the two largest and electorally-viable opposition parties are stooges of the government is not new. In fact, Burjanadze herself was subject to similar criticism after she left government and joined the opposition. To gain acceptance, her reputation for an even temperament and a conciliatory approach was quickly replaced with fieriness and radical stances that included advocating power transfer by revolution rather than elections, which her party was unlikely to win.

“This so-called opposition was speaking on behalf of the Georgian people and the opposition,” accused Burjanadze. “This so called opposition says that we should wait for 2012 [parliamentary elections] and that the U.S. assistance will come to help improve electoral system and voter lists… This opposition is either in direct deal with the authorities, or they totally lack experience.”

Despite the rhetoric, the Christian Democrats and Alasania’s bloc were given the greatest support besides Saakashvili’s United National Movement from Georgian voters. It is telling that not only did these parties earn a relatively large number of votes, but also built campaigns around policy proposals rather than a wholly anti-Saakashvili strategy.

Yet instead, according to Burjanadze, if one plays the democratic game instead of seeking a ‘revolution’ to overthrow the government without evidence of popular support , then one is a government puppet, or lacks “experience.” Of course, it’s entirely appropriate to mention that her political party has almost no support. It’s as though she believes entitled to power as though such an arrangement were as natural as the sun rising.

Burjanadze’s refusal to participate was apparently linked to the fact that the leadership forum was not an appropriate place to discuss politics. Apparently, Nino Burjanadze is above such pedestrian matters as women’s advancement in Georgia. And so, in the end, Nino Burjanadze – a woman with infantismile political support, almost nothing in the way of a political program, who advocates extra-constitutional revolutions, and calls more successful political parties puppets for not following her lead – feels that she is too good to participate in an informal discussion with Clinton and Georgian women leaders?

This woman could really use a reality check.

Footnotes

[1] http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22488

Michael Cecire contributed to this article.

by Michael Cecire

Stalin’s statue in Gori was removed early in the morning of June 25. In the process, a Gori television station alleges that police assaulted their film crew. If true, this is just another example of priorities out of control.

Tbilisi | Gori has bid adieu to its famous towering statue of former Soviet dictator Josef Stalin (neé Ioseb Besarionis dze Jughashvili), which was removed over around midnight on June 25 by Georgian authorities. Presumably, the late-night removal, which included a police-enforced cordon, was to prevent angry protests by local Gorelians—many of whom still revere the Georgian-Ossetian seminarian-turned-tyrant who scholars say has the blood of some 20 million people on his hands. The six-meter statue will apparently be moved to the Stalin museum down the road and replaced with a memorial for victims of the August 2008 Russian invasion.

Though a protest against the statue’s removal has yet to transpire (for now), it seems that the Georgian government has predictably managed to color an already sensitive decision with even more controversy. According to Trialeti television, a Gori-based station, their journalists were assaulted by police after trying to gain access to the statue’s removal. [1]

“Journalist Lado Bichashvili and cameraman Imeda Gogoladze were physically assaulted and their camera was seized by police,” announced a statement on Trialeti’s website. Apparently, police caught the crew trying to film and forced the crew to dispose of the footage they already had. [2]

Assuming the incident’s details are true, the story of the Stalin statue’s removal is coming to resemble an allegory of today’s Georgian government itself—a movement that is obsessed with the trappings of Westernization but tolerant of illiberal means of achieving those ends. This, of course, is not the first time that events surrounding the famed Statue have been tinged with qualifiers. In a recent interview with Kommersant, powerful Georgian interior minister Vano Merabishvili let slip an arrangement the Georgian government tried to broker with Russian occupation forces in Gori during the 2008 war.

“We decided to exchange the possibility of getting rid of Stalin for money [USD 50,000],” said Merabishvili. “They [the Russian military] bombed Gori, but they did not touch monument of Stalin.”

The twin events—Merabishvili’s story and today’s statue removal—happen to be seeped in syrupy irony as they both involve questionable events leading up to an attempt to remove the renowned statue. In Merabishvili’s case, it was colluding with occupation forces. In this recent case, it was assaulting journalists. Though the Georgian government deserves credit for economic growth and a general consolidation of semi-democratic institutions, the government’s ennui in the realm of democratic development (as opposed to political development)—despite an unquenchable thirst for all kinds of economic reform (however laudable) [3]—lends to the notion that the priorities of this government is more about the image of Westernization rather than true democratization itself.

Stalin’s statue is seen by many in Georgia’s liberal elite as an embarrassing stain to be removed. And like other impediments or embarrassments, the collateral damage of its removal is little more than an afterthought. Consider the deaths of two people after the government haphazardly blew up a memorial in Kutaisi and the ensuing panic that followed the Imedi pseudo-broadcast in March. [4] In these cases as well, the Georgian government was seeking to make some kind of symbolic point and pursued its goal blindly and with dangerous clumsiness. Although some people may consider the beatings as just an unfortunate and isolated event, the persistent incidence of these types of things points to a worrying pattern.

Not long after the local elections, Lincoln Mitchell, an Associate at Columbia University’s eminent Harriman Institute for Russian, Eurasian, and Eastern European Studies, was a relatively lonely and downbeat voice in the West commenting on the Georgian elections. In an article for The Faster Times, Mitchell spoke of Georgia’s constitutional reform process, which some say could strengthen the prime ministerial post in anticipation of Saakashvili’s finished presidential term in 2013, and Georgia’s increasing closeness to Iran.

“It should at least be considered that Georgia would instead of moving toward becoming a Western style democracy will further consolidate its strongman regime through constitutional pyrotechnics beginning in 2013,” lamented Mitchell, who served as the Chief of Party for the esteemed National Democratic Institute Georgia mission in the formative period of 2002-2004. [5]

Mitchell’s warnings, along with a pattern of diminished interest in democratic development by many Georgian officials, moves beyond the usual rhetoric and tired comparisons between Georgia and European countries or its decidedly undemocratic neighbors. Indeed, to compare the Georgian government with the likes of authoritarian Russia or even autocratic Armenia tends to miss the point—Georgia should be at a point where it no longer needs or aspires to be compared to such countries. Georgia’s can’t have it both ways where it claims in some cases to be on a completely different orbit from the rest of the Caucasus but, when it turns to the subject of democracy, pleads for patience and points to comparatively less-developed neighbors to block criticism.

This is quite a bit to carve out of a couple of roughed-up journalists in Gori, but it doesn’t change the fact that a democratic deficit hangs over Georgia in a major way. Even if the story about Trialeti’s film crew turns out to be false, the larger issue of insincere political reforms and institutional whitewashing becomes no less important.

Time will tell whether or not Georgia is planning to take actual democratic reforms seriously. But I suspect that true democracy will not be featured in Georgia’s political landscape anytime soon without some serious changes in the days ahead. The Georgian government can do all it wants to remove Stalin’s statue, erase his words, and scratch out his likeness from the land. But none of that matters as long as Stalin’s legacy and autocratic inclinations live on and continue to haunt Georgia’s corridors of power.

Footnotes

[1] http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22453
[2] http://trialeti.ge/
[3] See: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22432
[4] See: http://en.trend.az/regions/scaucasus/georgia/1604163.html; and http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav031510b.shtml
[5] http://thefastertimes.com/foreignpolicy/2010/06/01/beyond-the-elections-in-georgia/

Excuses, excuses

Many apologies for the hiatus. With the World Cup roaring (Go USA, Go Netherlands!) and a planned website upgrade in the works, we haven’t had the time to post much lately. However, that will change very soon. Also, we are open to submissions from guest writers, so feel free to send pitches to info@evolutsia.net. Thanks for reading Evolutsia.Net!

by Michael Cecire

The election results tell two tales: one, of Saakashvili’s UNM being rewarded for progress; and two, of a latent opposition that only needs refining to be truly competitive. Evolutsia.Net examines both.

Tbilisi | The election results are in. Although there is some back and forth going on as to the exact numbers – so far only exit polls and preliminary numbers are being referenced – it’s clear that the ruling United National Movement has maintained a strong hold of Georgian political institutions, including winning a commanding majority in the much-watched Tbilisi mayoral election. [1] So far, all of the observer missions have reported that the election, despite expected minor deficiencies here and there, could be counted as reasonably free and fair. Evolutsia.Net has corresponded with several election observers who, though noticing moderately questionable incidents, expressed confidence in the general integrity of the process.

There are two ways to look at the results. Many commentators, including the highly recommended Giorgi Kvelashvili, see the outcome as an affirmation of the UNM’s policies and reforms. In the Jamestown Foundation blog, Kvelashvili writes that the “results show that President Saakashvili and his party enjoy broad public support despite, or rather due to, the radical reforms carried out in all spheres of Georgian life, be it privatization, liberalization of the economy or westernization of Georgia’s education system, public services, law enforcement and military.” [2]

Without a doubt, any sober comparison of Georgia today to even a few years ago bears out this notion. Observers and analysts, Evolutsia.Net included, often take the time to point out Georgia’s deficiencies as though it were in a vacuum. However, by any reasonable measure, Georgia’s relative progress in the past decade deserves repeated acknowledgement. Almost certainly, Georgian voters agree, and the projected outcome of the election demonstrates that the electorate recognizes that Georgia’s rapid growth and development did not happen spontaneously.

For sure, problems still remain – and the UNM may even deserve blame for some of them – but on a balance, it’s difficult to not at least partially credit Saakashvili and his allies with Georgia’s speedy progress.

At the same time, economic growth and stabilizing institutions does not equal democracy. Georgia’s languishing position as a middling polity in Freedom House’s global freedom index is as much a reason to worry as it has been a point of pride. Though Georgia’s results with economic development and combating corruption has been unusually positive, Georgia is nearing a point where its decided lack of progress on its freedom rating should be of genuine concern. Indeed, Freedom House rates Georgia today exactly where it did in 2003, with a score of 4:4 for political rights and civil liberty, respectively (lower is better). [3] Between 2005-2007, Georgia’s score improved to an apex of 3:3 in 2007 before falling again to 4:4 in 2008 (reflecting the November 2007 crackdown), where it has remained ever since.

And this is where the other interpretation of the poll numbers comes in. Although the UNM won handily, moderate parties were able to garner respectable showings. In Tbilisi’s mayoral race, former UN ambassador Irakli Alasania’s Alliance managed 19 percent and Gia Chanturia of the Christian Democrats came out with 10.7 percent, according to CEC preliminary numbers. If one considers that the Alliance was laden with a series of missteps and a serious case of an identity crisis, [4] that the Christian Democrats are routinely (fairly or not) seen as external appendages of the UNM and do not seem to have presidential ambitions, and that both parties did not have the advantage of incumbency and administrative resources at their disposal, it becomes clear that there is a real market in Georgia for a credible, moderate opposition. Conversely, the poor showing of Zviad Dzidziguri’s National Council and the non-participation of Nino Burjanadze’s party prove that radical, pro-Moscow politics are not turning out to be the next ‘big thing’ in Georgia. Interestingly enough, Tbilisi, which gave majority votes to the opposition in the hotly-contested 2008 presidential elections, this time around swung back to the UNM, indicating that opposition-inclined voters were unconvinced and unenthusiastic about the current crop of opposition candidates.

Instead, the elections might be taken as an indication that there is a considerable pool of support for an opposition, but not if it appears immature, endangers economic growth, or is willing to sacrifice Georgian sovereignty. In short, certain segments of the Georgian population could be persuaded by a centrist alternative to Saakashvili’s UNM.

Of course, even assuming that such a faction was to coalesce overnight, there is no guarantee that the opposition would be ready or able to dislodge the UNM from power. Some of Georgia’s democratic shortcomings aside, the ruling party continues to retain a considerable amount of goodwill from the electorate for its resilience and possibly for its comparatively sober approach to politics and governance. Nonetheless, there is still a strong case for the existence and healthy development of a centrist opposition, even if it does not capture electoral offices, as it provides a check on the ruling party to live up to their promises. In addition, a relatively successful opposition bolsters the public perception that change is indeed possible through democratic mechanisms, as opposed to the revolution-centric, extra-constitutional approach that many of the more extreme opposition candidates promote.

Irakli Alasania and his Alliance allies are probably best placed after this election to fill this vacancy, but they have a lot of work to do if they are to be significantly more competitive in the 2012 parliamentary elections. First on the agenda, Alasania needs to completely disavow any relationship to pro-Moscow politicians and clarify his position on the issue, which has been a confusing mess as of late. In his obsessive quest for unity, Alasania found himself temporarily in bed with the likes of the politically toxic and pro-Kremlin Zurab Noghaideli, which distracted from Alasania’s core campaign themes and made him seem an unreliable opportunist. Meanwhile, in his desire to be all things to all people, he simultaneously promised better relations with Moscow and to continue with a pro-NATO path. The inherent conflict in this position must be resolved.

Alasania could also benefit from a comprehensive policy manifesto that, rather than breaking from functioning Saakashvili policies or jumping on cheap populism, could continue pro-growth policies, disperse political power, and increase the capacity of Georgia’s military deterrent. If Alasania were able to communicate a ‘softer touch’ approach to governance than what is being offered by the UNM, along with meaningful and sensible policy alterations, the Alliance could emerge as a plausible force in future political contests.

The above can also be translated for other political parties, either currently in existence or still-forming. Either way, it is clear that the health of Georgian democracy seriously depends on the development of a strong and policy-minded opposition that can meaningfully compete in Georgian politics. It is evident that the UNM has won a strong confidence vote in these last elections, but it does not mean that their say over the electorate is total or eternal. Though Alasania’s record as a candidate has been checkered at best, the recent election campaign did exhibit a noticeable uptick in attention to policy, something that may be largely attributed to Alasania’s participation. If Alasania or another opposition candidate is able to learn the right lessons from these election results, then there is no reason that the opposition couldn’t be a significant factor in 2012 and 2013.

Footnotes

[1] http://www.messenger.com.ge/issues/2117_june_1_2010/2117_results.html
[2] http://jamestownfoundation.blogspot.com/2010/06/secrets-behind-saakashvilis-spectacular.html
[3] See: http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=22&country=7827&year=2010
[4] See: http://evolutsia.net/?p=1551