Caucasus Watch is a biweekly roundup focusing on the region’s major stories. The project is led by Analyst Remy Gwaramadze with support from the entire Evolutsia.Net team. The next issue of Caucasus Watch will be published on February 14.

In this issue of Caucasus Watch, some good news for Georgia as it rises again economic freedom rankings. South Ossetia, which could undoubtedly use some good economic news, has run into another stumbling block with their problem-plagued reconstruction program. In Azerbaijan, the authorities appear to be cracking down hard on religious groups, but are getting cozy with their Russian neighbors as a deal is reached to double gas exports. From Ukraine, Tymoshenko andYanukovich continue to trade barbs over the role of the Georgian ‘election observers.’ Back in Abkhazia, unrest is festering in the Georgian Gali region.

All after the jump.

In this issue:

- Georgia again rises in ‘economic freedom’ rankings
- South Ossetia reconstruction under fire for delays, poor quality
- Azerbaijan tightens grip over religious freedom
- Gazprom will buy more Azerbaijani gas
- Follow-up on the Georgian observers in Donetsk, Ukraine
- Unrest in Gali region of breakaway Abkhazia

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Georgia again rises in ‘economic freedom’ rankings
by Michael Cecire

Tbilisi | The Washington-based Heritage Institute has released it’s 2010 rankings on world economic freedom and Georgia again made the mark. According to the rankings, which were done in cooperation with the Wall Street Journal, Georgia is now ranked 26th in the world for economic freedom, rising 0.6 point to 70.4. According to the Heritage Institute’s report, Georgia’s slight rise was due to “improvements in trade freedom, property rights, and freedom from corruption” [1]. This continues Georgia’s continued average improvement since the rankings first began in 1995.

In addition, the modest boost has pushed Georgia into the category of “mostly free,” underlining the terrific progress the country has made in the past decade of the new millennium. The report also stressed that despite the war and the economic crisis, it expected Georgia to regain growth in 2010. “Georgia is well positioned,” said the report, “to restart its economic expansion [in 2010].”

The Georgian ministry of economic development expects 2% GDP growth for 2010.

[1] http://www.heritage.org/Index/Country/Georgia

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South Ossetia reconstruction under fire for delays, poor quality
by Remy Gwaramadze

Warsaw | During a joint conference on January 27 attended by representatives various organizations and contractors operating in South Ossetia, the local and central authorities announced that the much-vaunted post-war reconstruction plan has not been fulfilled. In response to heavy criticism, de facto president Eduard Kokoity said that all contractors were provided with funds needed to purchase materials and perform construction, yet out of 429 planned residential buildings, none had been finished. Kokoity named a new deadline for handing over most of the buildings for February 10 [1].

But the delays itself were not the only object of criticism. The quality of the ongoing construction was cast under serious doubt. For such failure of reconstruction works, “no one will get away without punishment,” said Eduard Kokoity in address to contractors and the technical inspectorate service. The tiny region’s de facto president underlined that further financing depends on quality and efficiency of current spending [2].

The reconstruction effort, which is being almost entirely financed from Russian state coffers, has been subject to a great deal of criticism from the very beginning, despite the large sums. In general, complaints have revolved around the severe misuse of the funding and exceedingly slow progress. Most experts point to South Ossetia’s endemic corruption, poor business environment, and lack of a fully-developed local economy as being the source of the problems.

[1] http://www.ekhokavkaza.com/archive/news/20100127/2759/2759.html?id=1941381

[2] http://cominf.org/node/1166482277

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Azerbaijan tightens grip over religious freedom
by Remy Gwaramadze

Warsaw | Azerbaijani authorities are again tightening their grip over religious freedom. In the city of Sumgayit, 30 km north of the capital Baku, 80 people from the Turkish islamic faction Nurcu have been detained under the charge of “illegal religious agitation.” About 150 forbidden books of religious content were confiscated [1]. Along with earlier reported crackdown in Bananyar, Nakhichevan, these were the most prominent such eventsin Azerbaijan for years.

The crackdown indicates rising influence of religious groups operating in Azerbaijan and unaffiliated to the state-sanctioned Caucasus Muslims Department, which supervises Islamic communities in Azerbaijan. In the North Caucasus region, radical Islam has proved to be highly immune to any form of physical harassment, and in some cases has even drawn strength from these actions. A wave of repression in Azerbaijan may trigger a further radicalization of extremist groups.

It is worth noting that the Nurcu movement is administrated and financed from the US by a prominent Turkish emigrant, Islamic activist Fethullah Gulen. Illegal and considered extremist in Azerbaijan, the organization in fact concentrates on missionary and education activities. The Nurcu movement has achieved success in Kazakhstan and Kyrgystan where it legally runs Turkish schools.

[1] http://en.apa.az/news.php?id=114621

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Gazprom will buy more Azerbaijani gas
by Remy Gwaramadze

Warsaw | On January 21, Gazprom announced that the gas supply deal with Azerbaijan’s SOCAR signed last year will be extended. The amount of gas export to Russia will be doubled from the pre-planned 500 million cubic meters to a full billion cubic meters in 2010. Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller added that imports will be again doubled to 2 bcm in 2011 and in general, Russia is willing to buy as much gas as Azerbaijan is able to provide [1].

This recent increase is Baku’s initiative and fits into their exports diversification strategy activated after the 2008 Russo-Georgian war. Hitherto, the main importer of Azeri gas was Turkey, but an ongoing conflict over pricing as well, political chilling between Turkey and Azerbaijan over the former’s overtures to Armenia, and a hazardous transit route passing alongside Georgia’s separatist South Ossetia region has pushed Baku to seek the Russian alternative. Besides Russia, Azerbaijan is directing its gas exports south to Iran. Azerbaijan’s moves are also a logical consequence of Europe’s inaction, hesitancy, and even weakness in developing the Southern Energy Corridor, considering Baku’s ever-growing extraction power and resultant export capacities.

Gazprom, on the other hand, has secured relatively good ground for future negotiations on imports from the currently developed phase II Shah Deniz field. It is worth noting that Russian strategy on buying out every free cubic meter of Caspian gas at preferential rates renders Gazprom’s pipes vastly competitive to the now-dubious Nabucco project, which can no longer count on Azeri participation as a given thing.

[1] http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/business/articles/eav012210.shtml

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Follow-up on the Georgian observers in Donetsk, Ukraine
by Inge Snip

Kiev | On January 17, Ukraine held the first round of its Presidential elections and Evolutsia.Net reported from Donetsk, where “big Georgian men came to make troubles,” as Presidential candidate Yanukovich had alleged. His reference was to Georgian observers who were denied accreditation, but were nonetheless sent to Donetsk by Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili.

After the election, much has been said about the situation as several of the unofficial observers were detained by the Donetsk police and occasional fights between locals and the Georgians were reported. In Georgia, the opposition used this situation to accuse Saakashvili of trying to intervene in Ukraine’s internal democratic process, whereas in Ukraine both presidential candidate Tymoschenko and Yanukovich were accusing each other of acting in an illegal manner over the Georgian observers’ presence.

Nevertheless, Saakashvili has continued to argue that he had discussed this issue with all the political parties in Ukraine prior to the elections and that he was surprised to hear Yanukovich arguing in opposition. A verified telephone recording between Tymoschenko and Saakashvili does confirm Saakashvili’s statement, as the recording contains Tymoschenko requesting Saakashvili to send the observers anyway. In a recent interview with Ukrainian newspaper Pravda, Tymoschenko reaffirmed that the Georgian observers were sent with her consent and that they had done a “very good job” [1].

Although it might seem odd that Tymoschenko would admit to requesting unofficial observers in Donetsk – a true Yanukovich region – it is unlikely that she would tally many votes there anyway. The people voting for her argue that she was correct in doing so, while those voting for Yanukovich were already not considering voting for her anyway.

Nevertheless, it may have been wise to release the statement after the second round, which will be held on February 8th, if she still wants to become Ukraine’s president. Tymoshenko will need the votes of Sergei Tigipko, who did not make it to the final round but still got 14% of the votes, which could make the difference for her campaign. However, Tigipko’s voters will likely divide up equally between Yanukovich and Tymoschenko, as they are relatively pro-Russia, which suggests Yanukovich vote, but generally wary of seeing Ukraine again dominated by Russia, which many believe will happen if Yanukovich gets the presidential seat.

The second round will be a very interesting one, and the results can have devastating results for not only Ukraine, but also European security and Georgia; Yanukovich has already promised Putin to recognize both Abkhazia and South-Ossetia as independent republics.

[1] http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/4b5ef82441271/

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Unrest in Gali region of breakaway Abkhazia
by Remy Gwaramadze

Warsaw | The situation in Gali district, a predominantly Georgian-populated region of breakaway Abkhazia, has grown tenser. Since January 18, mixed reports on various assaults and abductions began to appear. According to RFE/RL’s Echo of the Caucasus, the Georgian media spread an unconfirmed rumor about a detained marshrutka (minibus) full of passengers in the village of Saberio. Another word is that 14 people were allegedly detained in Kvemo Bargebi and, according to Tornike Kilanava, the representative of Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia in exile, 5 more men were arrested on their way to Saberio. A resident of Saberio, contacted by Echo of the Caucasus, did not confirm any of above, but has described one more incident. According to her, a group unknown men assaulted the house of the Tsirgvava family the previous night. They were robbed and the elder son was reportedly abducted [1].

Two days later another incident took place and has been confirmed. On January 20, Russian border guards detained a group of Georgian children from Saberio, who were crossing into Georgia proper as part of an everyday routine as they were students of the Georgian primary school in Pakhulani, Tsalenjika region. They were detained for a couple of hours and released upon their parents’ arrival. Luckily, subsequent meetings concerning incident prevention had the Russian delegation describe the detention of children as an “error among border guards” and, according to Shota Utiashvili, the two sides agreed that “children are subject to special rules and may cross the border in any sector” [2]. Therefore, emerging concerns about forcing Georgian children living in Gali district to attend local Russian schools – forcible “Russification” – is a myth.

The most tragic event occured in Gali district on January 29. An Abkhaz police unit arrived at the village of Chuburkhinji after the call of a reported burglary. When they arrived, their car was destroyed by a landmine. The blast resulted in the death of one policeman and two civilians, and left seven more wounded [3]. Otar Khetsia, the Abkhaz de-facto minister of interior points to a “deliberate act against employees of the Gali police.” Khetsia also reportedly called it a pre-planned operation aimed at “destabilizing the situation” in Gali [4].

[1] http://www.ekhokavkaza.com/content/article/1932898.html
[2] http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Troops_Keep_Georgian_Students_From_Crossing_Border/1936185.html
[3] http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=21931
[4] http://www.rian.ru/incidents/20100129/206860031.html

by Michael Cecire

A rumor has been confirmed: Russia’s planned purchase of French Mistral-class warships is conditioned on blocking Georgia-sponsored Russian-language satellite channel First Caucasian. An already controversial deal gets even dicier.

Tbilisi | The rumor, that the Eutelsat’s sudden discontinuation of Georgia’s First Caucasian satellite channel was linked to Moscow-Paris backroom deals – and the planned sale of the Mistral-class warship in particular – had been circulating among the Georgia intelligentsia as soon as the channel began to experience ‘problems.’ These problems, despite Eutelsat’s ever-fluctuating narrative, were suggested to be political in nature, according to the rumors and, later, a Le Figaro piece on the shady circumstances [1].

In the service of another capacity, your correspondent has been researching this rumor and received confirmation late last night via a source close to the Pentagon. This morning, the well-respected defense analysis blog Information Dissemination came to the same conclusion and has also confirmed the rumor [2]. ID’s follow-up analysis is also a must-read.

“As we watch Russia leverage their unequal national power to influence France, keep an eye on eastern European countries like Poland,” cautions ID. “This will get bigger than Russia, Georgia, and France before it is all over, and the potential for long term consequences in Eastern Europe is not trivial.”

ID is absolutely correct in this assumption. While the blog highlights defense acquisitions and procurement issues in particular, the damage that will engulf NATO’s internal politics will not be inconsiderable. As the indispensable Jamestown Foundation’s Vladimir Socor writes in an article, NATO-Russia relations will not be a casualty, particularly considering that NATO is doing its best to patch things up with Russia. “The more relevant issue is that of integrity of NATO’s internal consultation processes and procedures,” notes Socor [3].

Perhaps more importantly, the scandal will surely serve to underscore the intense geopolitical dissonance regarding Russia within the Alliance. While most Western European states – especially Germany, France, and Italy (somewhat in that order) – have been especially pushy about distancing from Georgia and rebuilding ties with Russia, Eastern European countries, and Poland and the Baltic States in particular, have been much more skeptical.

That France would willfully censor Georgian media in exchange for a shipbuilding deal sets a new standard for a country already with a heavy reputation for a ‘mercenary’ foreign policy beholden to industrial interests (See: Rafale, Dassault). Paris’s complicity in Kremlin censorship could regenerate opposition in the U.S., despite an apparent administration order to allow the deal to go through. The possibility of renewed pressure from Eastern European EU members, the U.S. Congress [4], and Georgia may create a chance – however slight – that the whole deal might be derailed. Yet, even if the deal pushes forward, internal divisions within NATO and the EU will still be sharper than ever.

If the scandal creates enough of a sensation to disrupt the deal, it may also be strong enough to force an unofficial arms embargo against Russia in Europe. But if the scandal is seen as a purely ‘French’ problem, Moscow may simply bring its cash elsewhere like Spain or the Netherlands, countries to which it has also been linked over arms purchases. Either way, Russia may have finally overstepped its bounds and France almost certainly has. Whether or not there will be consequences and how this will shape policy in the coming days is still an open question.

Photo: Mistral-class helicopter carrier. Source: Wikimedia Commons

Footnotes

[1] http://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2010/01/27/01003-20100127ARTFIG00623-rumeurs-sur-l-arret-d-une-chaine-georgienne-antirusse-.php

[2] http://www.informationdissemination.net/2010/01/mistral-sale-and-russian-information.html

[3] http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35956

[4] http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/12/22/republican_ready_to_tie_iran_sanctions_to_french_russian_arms_deal

by Michael Cecire

Former Georgian PM Zurab Noghaideli has been making headlines by breaking political taboos and holding meetings with the Kremlin and their proxies. Are his actions a profile of courage or the mark of dangerous attention-seeking?

Tbilisi | The opposition in Georgia has been often referred to as a monolith, suggesting that their interests all converge. Indeed, much of the opposition has been keen to underscore their similarities rather than their differences in order to present a relatively united front against the strength of Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili’s political dominance. This was particularly on display during the months-long series of opposition protests that began last April and went into the summer.

While the assortment of multifarious party banners and factions were able to come together in their opposition to Saakashvili’s government, the unity of the opposition was always something of a superficial phenomenon. As the number of opposition factions ticks higher, the ability for these groups to maintain a semblance of cooperation has increasingly dissipated, not cemented, despite the temporary alliance that saw backing for opposition MP Levan Gachechiladze’s bid for the presidency in 2008.

Irakli Alasania, the former Georgian Ambassador to the United Nations under Mikheil Saakashvili, emerged as a major force of the opposition after he joined the ranks of other disaffected former-ministers like Nino Burjanadze and Salome Zourabichvili. But unlike Burjanadze and Zourabichvili, Alasania was keen to strike a more centrist tone. This less-fiery brand of opposition revealed deeper cracks in the opposition, as he has been caricatured by the more radical elements of the opposition as being a ’stooge’ to the government while Western moderates were keen to embrace his entry into the field as the logical next step in Georgia’s political development [1]. Alasania’s credible bid for the Tbilisi mayoral post, for example, appears to have spooked the normally-complacent government, which enjoys almost total dominance of the country’s political machinery [2].

Zurab Noghaideli, the former Prime Minister, may represent yet another strain. Seen as a successful economic manager and technocrat, his rather abrupt reentry into politics may be only further splintering the increasingly-finite ranks of opposition support. Rather than holding protests, Noghaideli pursued more controversial means of attracting attention: trips to Moscow. In 2009, Noghaideli has visited Moscow no less than four times, during which he also was granted audience with none other than Vladimir Putin himself. For a country still smarting from the effects of the August 2008 war, the decision could be considered nothing less than a political Hail Mary, with Noghaideli betting that Georgians are weary of their besieged geopolitical position and open to normalizing relations with their longtime foe.

But Noghaideli’s cavalier style has not only rankled the ruling party, but also fellow opposition leaders Alasania and Zourabichvili. Zourabichvili recently described Noghaideli’s actions as “senseless,” and noted that his actions could serve to “discredit” the opposition movement as a whole [3]. Of course, this is the same Zourabichvili that has in the past endorsed key elements of the Russian version of events that led to the August war.

Noghaideli has not given any real indication that he is necessarily in the service of the Kremlin, and his actions may just represent a political bet that the Georgian people want to put the era of high tensions with Russia behind them. Still, as evidenced by Noghaideli’s stated intention to sign ‘cooperative’ agreements with Russia’s authoritarian United Russia party, it is clear that Noghaideli’s policy aspirations are at least partially built on greater deference to Georgia’s historical overlord to the north.

It remains to be seen whether or not his calculated move will pay off for him, but if Noghaideli can win concessions from Russia in his next trip, even if they are built on questionable assumptions of Russian fidelity to their word, he may be able bring his fringe movement greater into the mainstream. More worryingly, other opposition figures may deign it necessary to co-opt his strategy and include a policy of detente as part of their policy platforms. Nino Burjanadze, who has been suspiciously quiet over Noghaideli’s forays, is undoubtedly watching his progress with no small interest.

It is unlikely that Georgia’s opposition will ever fully embrace the Russian bear, but trading faux concessions from Russia in exchange for political benefits may prove to be a Faustian bargain. In a situation where Russia continues to hold a number of advantages over Georgia, any ‘concessions’ that Moscow grants will likely not be made in good faith or will be conditional upon even greater items from Tbilisi.

Perhaps not coincidentally, Russia has altered its tact towards Georgia as of late. Instead of mere bullying, the Kremlin appears to sending overtures to Georgia – in the form of economic and transit links – to reestablish leverage. Since the Rose Revolution, Georgia has seen its economic and transit links with Russia cut off one by one, actions that have been generally been regarded as ‘punishment’ for Georgia’s Westward orientation. Instead of crippling Georgia, however, Russia only served to free the countries of its total economic dependency and pushed the country even further towards the West. Renewing these contacts is a bid by Russia to regain lost ground in what Moscow appears to concede was a myopic strategy.

Moscow’s change of heart coupled with entertaining Noghaideli’s entreaties are quite possibly linked. While Noghaideli may see his outreach to Russia as a shrewd political move – or even as a genuinely positive step in reconciliation – he and others like him may be turned unwittingly (or even wittingly) into instruments of the Kremlin’s desire to dictate Georgia’s future.

Photo: Zurab Noghaideli. Source: Wikimedia Commons

Footnotes

[1] See: http://georgiandaily.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=14842&Itemid=132

[2] http://www.rferl.org/content/Smear_Offensive_Targets_Rising_Georgian_Political_Star/1941519.html

[3] http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=21921

[4] http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=21921

by Inge Snip

Evolutsia.Net analyst Inge Snip travels from Orange Kiev to the heart of Yanukovych country in Donetsk, eastern Ukraine. She finds that up close, things at the polls aren’t what they may seem from the media coverage. And it may only be the beginning.

Donetsk | Ukraine’s long-awaited elections were held on January 17, four years after the Orange revolution. Though the revolution’s colors and fervor had long ago faded into gloom, the unmistakable stamp of the revolution continues to dictate the country’s political makeup, as the country is still divided in two major camps: the Yanukovych camp and the non-Yanukovych camp – also referred to as the pro-Russian and pro-Western camps. However, the division in Ukraine, which is also geographically noticeable, was not the only issue keeping the Ukrainians occupied as gossip flooded the country of impending fraud initiated by either Tymoschenko or Yanukovych – and what did Georgians have to do with this? Evolutsia.net went to Donetsk on election day, Yanukovych’s former playground, to get to the bottom of this.

At 6 in the morning on Jan. 17, your correspondent arrived in Donetsk from Kiev, awaited by Oksana, a student in Donetsk who had offered to help translating during the day. After a quick shower, we headed to the polling station, where we tagged along with a Danish election monitoring mission. The day starts calm and easy; while talking to many of the voters, they seem to agree that there will be fraud, but on a higher level and “not so much at the polling stations.”

Remarkably, they all mention the language issue as being highly important. In eastern Ukraine, the primary language spoken is Russian, and all voters say they feel abandoned and disrespected by their government for denying Russian as a second official language. This language sensitivity seemed to be the primary issue voiced by the people of Donetsk, compelling them to vote Yanukovych, who has promised to elevate Russian as the second official language. Nevertheless, the poor economic status of the region appeared to contribute to a general insecurity about the future. All voters – whether for Yanukovych, Tymoschenko, or Tigipko – claim the Orange Revolution had brought nothing but disaster.

In 2003, the Moscow-backed oligarchs had chosen Russia-backed Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych as their candidate to succeed Leonid Kuchma as President. However, in what came to be known as the Orange Revolution, a peaceful uprising proclaimed the elections to be fraudulent and the apparently poisoned pro-West Viktor Yuschenko was voted Ukraine’s President.

Yanukovych was the Governor of Donetsk Oblast, the nation’s most populous region, between 1997 and 2002. Donetsk city is a city that was founded by a Welsh man, creating a coal-industry in the region at the end of the 19th century and once a city was named after Stalin (‘Stalino’ 1924 – 1961). It is located in eastern Ukraine, and is known for its pro-Russia orientation, and even threatened to secede from Ukraine after the fall of the Soviet Union.

The region is inhabited by people who have little love for the West; after the fall of the Soviet union, almost all coal mines closed, inordinately affecting the people of Donetsk, who came to regard the series of events as a patent disaster. The global recession, obviously, has not helped. In addition, the Donetsk region has been said by many Western analysts as having the  highest risk for fraudulent elections.

Nevertheless, the people of Donetsk have hope, and all of the voters Evolusia.net spoke with mentioned that the person they had voted for (for a variety of candidates) would be the one to change their situations for the better. For example, a woman selling coffee at one of the polling stations, who has not received a salary for over two months, voiced hope for the future, despite tears in her eyes. Or, the wealthy-looking elderly couple who saw their beloved region tumbling down into crisis. “If we don’t have hope, we have nothing left,” they related. And the school director who hosted one of the polling stations in his school’s gym, claiming the last few years were a culmination of bad policies, but confident that a new president would bring positive change.

However, they all expressed fear of fraud during the elections. At our first polling station, your correspondent spoke with a young lady, who claimed something which seemed at first to be nothing more than a bizarre gossip: that 100 Georgians came to Donetsk to ‘make trouble’ at the polling stations [1]. Although, of course I had heard about the purported phone conversation [2] between Saakashvili and Tymoschenko, I did not take this woman too seriously. However, as the day progressed, more and more people mentioned the Georgians coming to Donetsk ‘to make trouble.’ Only 100 in the morning, but by 1p.m. it had somehow ballooned to 800 Georgians.

According to local journalist Jana, the Georgians were refused accreditation, but still decided to come; others stated they had come because Yulia Tymoschenko had paid them to “make fights and disturb the elections,” as one put it. Others saw a Machiavellian plot: the Georgians were bring paid by Yanukovych to frame Tymoschenko by making people think it was her who had paid them to come. Clearly, it did not seem that the people in Eastern Ukraine were terribly fond of Georgians, which may be a symptom of the region’s overwhelming reliance on local pro-Russia media and Russian state media. Again, it became painfully clear how divided the country really is.

However, it is worth noting that a majority of Georgians who came to Donetsk came without accreditation. In addition, they did try to get into polling stations without the necessary permission. According to Georgian Deputy Foreign Minister Nino Kalandadze, Georgia still had send their observers, and that they consisted of “employees of various state structures, including of Parliament, local self-governance bodies, as well as representatives of non-governmental organizations.” She stated that, “It is unfortunate that representatives of some political parties [in Ukraine] had a doubt about the status and sincerity of our observers.” However, if one is not accredited, one has no official status.

If the Georgian government had grievances about their observers’ statuses, they could have filed an official complaint. The decision to send these observers in spite of their non-accreditation seemed to have only triggered a backlash among Ukrainians, which is hardly the foundation upon which ‘alliances’ are made [3].

The OSCE’s observation mission found the elections to be high quality. “The first round of Ukraine’s presidential election was of high quality and showed significant progress over previous elections, meeting most OSCE and Council of Europe commitments,” read an OSCE statement. However, the certification should be qualified by taking into account the conditions in Donetsk and knowing only five OSCE observers were present in the region of almost 5 million. In your correspondent’s observations, there was room for concern, such as a polling station where votes seemed to be checked for the ‘right’ candidate after depositing. Still, while the system can be interpreted in many various ways, it seemed that on a local level the elections were conducted in a more or less genuine manner.

On Jan. 18, with 80.27% of ballots counted at the polls, Victor Yanukovych received 35.76% of votes, Yulia Tymoshenko 24.72%, and Sergiy Tigipko 13.05%; which means there will likely be a second round on Feb. 7 between Yanukovych and Tymoschenko. It will most probably be a close tie and may be an even more interesting election day. However, the chances are minor there will be any more unauthorized Georgians stirring up gossip in the eastern Ukraine.

Photo: Photographs by Inge Snip

Footnotes

[1] See: http://evolutsia.net/?p=1151#ukraine

[2] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zweUkvJE64M

[3] See: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=21898

According to Civil.Ge, Georgia is joining the world in dispatching help to Haiti, which was recently afflicted with a devastating earthquake. Though certainly a PR move on some level, the decision highlights the Georgian government’s geopolitical maturity.

Tbilisi | Georgia has plenty of issues on its own, from a warped political environment to the endlessly haunting specter of war from its enigmatic and hostile northern neighbor. Despite these and many other problems, Georgia has been keen to showcase its commitment in being a net contributor to global stability, with the country’s surprisingly outsized deployment to Afghanistan’s troubled regions [1] as a prime example.

According to Civil.Ge, Georgia has also chosen to respond to the overwhelming need in Haiti by joining much of the world in sending aid to the beleaguered country [2]. Credit where it’s due, the Saakashvili government has never shown any inclination to shrink from being active in international missions. While such deployments are usually closely aligned with Georgian national interests – like currying favor with key Western powers – the Haiti aid can be seen as more of a wise international PR move.

The self-interest that may or may not have been factored into the decision to send aid should not detract from the generosity of the gesture. Aid is aid, after all, and like Georgia’s Afghanistan deployment, there are unlikely to be any preconditions. While one would hope that politics would not be an issue during such a time, it has not stopped some countries like France, whose brutal colonial history in Haiti gives it a particularly special responsibility in this affair [3], from accusing the US of ‘occupation.’ A strange barb to level against the country which is leading the world in aid shipments and personnel, particularly when coming from Haiti’s former longtime occupier.

Although the exact figures for the Georgian aid shipments have yet to be released in great detail, it is not likely to compare to that of richer Western countries for many reasons. Nonetheless, it illustrates the Georgian government’s commitment to international stability and a willingness to be taken seriously as a reliable international partner.

Photo: US troops unload relief supplies in Haiti’s airport in Port-au-Prince. Source: Wikimedia Commons

[1] http://worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=4883

[2] http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=21880

[3] See: http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-01-14/why-haitis-earthquake-is-frances-problem/

Caucasus Watch is a biweekly roundup focusing on the region’s major stories. The project is led by Analyst Remy Gwaramadze with support from the entire Evolutsia.Net team. The next issue of Caucasus Watch will be published on January 31st.

In this issue, Evolutsia.Net asks whether or not President Saakashvili’s proposed ‘military-patriotic’ classes are hitting the right notes. Is this just another case of skewed priorities, or is something more nefarious afoot? Also in Georgia, the Mukhrovani trial has come to an end, and with some interesting results. Less interesting was the turnout for the Batumi energy conference, except for a highly ambitious plan to build an LNG terminal. Further afield, Azerbaijan continues to showcase its turn away from Europe, making the already-complicated Caucasus even more so. And speaking of chaos, the headache over Georgia’s unaccredited election monitors in Ukraine turns nasty as a suspicious conversation between Saakashvili and Ukrainian Prime Minister/oligarch Tymoshenko surfaces.

All after the jump.

In this issue:

- Military Patriotic Classes in Georgian Schools
- Mukhrovani Trial Verdicts Announced
- Georgia Plans to build LNG Production Plant
- Chaos in Nakhchevan
- Wiretapping Controversy on the Eve of Ukraine Presidential Elections

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Military Patriotic Classes in Georgian Schools
by Inge Snip

Kiev | Although Evolutsia.Net has traditionally given Saakashvili the benefit of the doubt, it seems that lately he has drifted away from the ‘enlightened’ and democratic path he has so strongly espoused in the past. His recent proposal to implement patriotic-military classes in schools can only be understood as a step backwards and smacks a bit too strongly of the beloved premium boss-man Vladimir Putin’s state indoctrination regime.

On January 12, during a televised meeting with schoolchildren and their teachers in Batumi, Saakashvili presented one of his new ideas to strengthen the Georgian nation – one that would be capable of defense against any aggressive neighbor.

“This system is being created in Georgia that will enable us to involve each and every person in defending the country. Only 16,000, 20,000, or 30,000 of our soldiers will not able to defend a country with population of 5 million; defending of the country with population of 5 million is a matter of all these 5 million people, as well as of the Georgians living abroad,” said the president [1].

According to the president, the main goal of the classes would be to replace ‘ignorance’ with patriotism. His plan was backed by several officials a few days later, explaining that the military-patriotic education would entail training in “civil defense, stimulating soldierly spirit and military history” and, according to Georgian Defense Minister Bacho Akhalaia, it would give the students a chance to learn “the basics of military discipline, major armament, the structures of armed forces, and even the handling of weapons.” When Akhalaia rose to the post of defense minister, he promised to do a fundamental reform of the Georgian military during his tenure – this was not what we had in mind.

Your correspondent is curious to know how this government got the ideas that: 1) shooting a gun is something the government should teach children; and, 2) Georgian people are ignorant. To start with the latter, anyone knowing Georgians and having the opportunity to know Georgian culture has experienced the pride and protectiveness of many Georgians towards their country and their values. The claim that the Georgian people are ignorant of such virtues is a strange one to make, unless the government hopes to stoke the fires of Gamsakhurdia-era nationalism – a path best left alone. Secondly, unless the Georgian military intends to conscript children into the military – which it absolutely should not, of course – weapons training for youth is a curiously illogical step.

However, some might argue that Georgia is a small country; that it has an aggressive neighbor and that it should therefore take all measures to be able to defend itself. While Georgia certainly requires a worthy defense, it’s difficult to understand how these classes will contribute to that defense. For instance, the fact that these children are going being taught ‘heroic’ stories to ‘make them proud’ of their home-country is too reminiscent of the same blunt indoctrination-dictatorial tactics that have been used by some of history’s most noxious regimes, including Georgia’s erstwhile imperial overlord, Russia. While there is much to be desired in Georgian education, the most pressing issue is certainly not a dearth of patriotic fervor; if anything, Georgian students might benefit from a little more nuance about Georgia’s checkered history in the early-to-mid1990s.

Your correspondent genuinely thinks that classes like this are a major step backwards. Moreover, it will definitely not benefit the relationship with Russia. If anything, in a geopolitical environment that apparently rewards abandoning Georgia, Georgia should be keener on buttressing its democratic credentials and deepening its level of political development. To this end, the idea of military patriotic classes creates problems that extend both to domestic and international affairs and should die a quiet, swift death.

[1] http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=21875

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Mukhrovani Trial Verdicts Announced
by Remy Gwaramadze

Warsaw | The so-called ‘Mukhrovani trial’ has finally come to an end. On May 5 of last year, during the peak of the opposition protests in Tbilisi, military forces stationed at the Mukhrovani army base (consisting mostly of armored forces) plotted and began a coup to overthrow the country’s legal authorities, but was busted at the very beginning of the plan’s implementation. On January 11, judge Jemal Kopaliani delivered severe verdicts for retired army colonel Koba Otanadze, former rangers battalion commander Levan Amiridze, and Mukhrovani tank battalion commander Shota Gorgiashvili; 29, 28, and 19 years in prison, respectively. Zurab Bzishvili, a tank crew member, got 9 years.

Kakha Kobaidze and Davit Sulkhanishvili, then-commanders of brigades in Kutaisi and Gori, had refused to take part in the mutiny but refrained from reporting the affair. They received relatively mild sentences of 3 conditional years  each in prison and few thousand lari. Zurab Chalatashvili, a former helicopter pilot of Alekseevka air base faced a similar verdict, 3 years in prison for not reporting his knowledge of the crime. The rest of the verdict went to a group of 12 civilians who allegedly assisted the coup – their conviction ranged from 9 to 15 years in prison. Another one, Zaza Sandodze, who probably just accidentally heard a little bit too much but didn’t want to sell off his relative, Koba Otanadze, earned 2 years imprisonment [1].

Severe verdicts, especially for the main 3 organizers and dozen of civilians, is a warning signal for the army and other national services that treason will not be tolerated. This signal is particularly important given current destabilizing transitional state in the country with still-smoldering political crises and the just-like-yesterday lost war with Russia. Despite Russia’s once heavily-implied role in Mukhrovani mutiny, no confirmation was found in the trial. Those allegations could have been muffled away for several reasons. It may be simply untrue, and had been used to help lower support for the ongoing massive opposition protests in Tbilisi. The other reason may refer to the current strategically important drive for a basic, technical settlement of Georgian-Russian relations. Better relations with Russia, more restrained rhetoric and technical issues like open borders and airlinks are in direct proportion to improvement of investment credibility in the eyes of pragmatic (and somewhat opportunistic) Western entrepreneurs, not to mention Western European governments. And, finally, of course, Russia’s involvement was not on trial here: the defendants listed above were.

Another interesting part of the Mukhrovani case is the clearing of coup charges for retired general Koba Kobaladze. He was found guilty of illegal firearms possession and sentenced for 8 months, but that’s the term which he already has served since the imprisonment in May, so he was immediately set free. It may be a first serious sign of the judiciary system’s independence from vast governmental influence. Even the pro-opposition Georgian International Media Centre seemed surprised with the news of Kobaladze’s release, whose alleged guilt has been constantly underlined by Mikheil Saakashvili himself [2]. Is the Georgian ruling elite scoring some extra democracy points by ‘easing the leash?’ Once eased it may never shorten back and even small steps forward are steps forward.

[1] http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=21869
[2] http://georgiamediacentre.com/content/mukhrovani_verdict_sees_misha_fail_get_his_man

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Georgia Plans to build LNG Production Plant
by Remy Gwaramadze

Warsaw | Disappointing. On January 14, Batumi was supposed to host international summit with a dozen heads of states, but instead ended up with a small conference with a handful of various state ministers. First one to pull out was Victor Yushchenko, probably too absorbed by his impending, certain election loss. According to Georgian PM Nika Gilauri, who represented Georgia at the event, Yushchenko’s forced absence caused a cascade of substitutions that brought the summit way down to the optimistically-described “top-level energy conference.” The proper summit has been postponed to an as yet-unnamed future date [1].

Besides some nodding chat about importance of Nabucco, White Stream and the South Corridor diversification route as such, one indeed interesting jewel issue has been raised. Nika Gilauri officially announced Georgia’s plans to build a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) production plant somewhere on Adjara’s Black Sea coast. The plant would process phase two gas from the rich Azerbaijani Shah Deniz fields [2] and delivered by a Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum pipeline spur, which is also to be created alongside the existing Baku-Supsa oil corridor.

The LNG gas market is considered to be more expensive but is rapidly growing due to it’s maximum flexibility and convenience for every party from gas producers through LNG hubs (such as Georgia intends to be) to recipients. Selling/buying LNG is based on dynamic short-term deals and no receiver is stuck with one supplier, heavily dependent on the stranglehold of pipeline infrastructure.

Georgia’s entrance into the LNG market is an exciting challenge and could generate serious prestige, considering the desired scale of production of 30 billion cubic meters a year. For comparison, it is just 1 bcm less than the perpetually-embattled Nabucco project. But as mentioned before, nothing is clear, and it is far from certain that this LNG production plant will be built. To be fair, with the high expense of such a plant and Georgia’s investment reliability under serious strain from a number of factors, not the least being last year’s war, the whole project needs more than words for it to generate the critical mass of buzz and cash to make it a reality.

[1] http://en.trend.az/capital/pengineering/1617737.html
http://en.trend.az/capital/pengineering/1618927.html
[2] http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a9CgCdV6MHdw

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Chaos in Nakhchivan
by Remy Gwaramadze

Warsaw | On December 28, some seriously disturbing events followed the Islamic Holy Day of Ashura celebrations in the village of Bananyar in Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. According to RFE/RL, [1] which quoted Asef Guliev from the opposition’s APF party, trouble began after the controversial ritual of self-lashing, when several villagers were arrested and beaten at police station of nearby Abragunus. One of the abducted, Kyamal Aliyev, 66, had reportedly been undressed and tied to a tree while being beaten. After arriving, Yunis Aliyev, the son of detained, poured gasoline over himself and threatened to light it if his father was not released. Encouraged by police, so did so.

When news about it spread, Bananyar residents marched towards the police station and staged regular protests. This triggered the police to impose full-scale control over the village. The terrorizing of inhabitants intensified on January 5, when approximately 500 men from Nakhchivan internal security entered the scene. It’s reported that since then, all houses, shops, and other services in the village were ransacked, some of them completely destroyed, and up to 150 people have been detained to an unknown location. According to a few who were released, beside regular beating they were being dragged outside and continually doused with cold water. The main objective of such “interrogations” was to obtain testimonies to implicate the head of the local (opposition party) APF office, Rza Nuriyev, with charges of staging anti-governmental protests [2]. In the meantime, Nakhchivan’s ministry of interior continues to report that nothing extraordinary is happening in the region.

Every information coming from Bananyar is based on whispered rumors. Telephone lines are suspected to be under surveillance. The area is virtually cut off from the outside world and remains under de facto martial law. On January 13, representatives of US and Norwegian embassies attempted to enter Bananyar, but their car was halted by unknown group at the outskirts and forced to return [3]. It’s not even clear what happened to Yunis Aliyev after he had been extinguished. One version says that he died in local hospital, the other that his family managed to get him out of “the zone” and he is now being treated in Tabriz, Iran.

As Azerbaijan is a secular state, religion is considered by the autocratic government as a source of potential instability and opposition. Well indeed, this is instability, but its source comes not from religion, but rather from state-sponsored atrocities combined with the total impunity of the local authority apparatus. The disastrous social conditions of Nakhchivan, like a lot other Azerbaijani regions, is another byproduct of the curse of the hydrocarbon mono-economy in Azerbaijan as it continues its relentless free fall into repression.

[1] http://www.azadliq.org/content/article/1922284.html
[2] http://www.azadliq.org/content/article/1923220.html
[3] http://www.azadliq.org/content/article/1929181.html

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Wiretapping Controversy on the Eve of Ukraine Presidential Elections
by Remy Gwaramadze

Warsaw | An odd brawl has risen over the approximately 2,000 Georgian observers that were denied registration at  the Ukrainian Central Election Commision. Russian state television is peddling stories about ‘Georgian thugs’ that came to eastern Ukraine (the mostly pro-Russian region) to disrupt the electoral process in favor of some unknown candidate. Who this candidate was became clear on Friday 15th when Russian news service RIA Novosti published [1] one ugly leak – a mysterious phone call [2] allegedly between Yulia Tymoshenko and Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili.

The tape contains a friendly conversation of man and woman of strikingly similar voices to these of Saakashvili and Tymoshenko. They talk about Georgian election observers and their problems to obtain official status. She [Tymoshenko] assures the interlocutor that everything is done in order to grant their legal status “without voting,” bearing in mind the CEC voting process to accredit observers. The man [Saakashvili] then states the efforts being put forward by Georgia in order to help Ukraine and that the people sent there are the most “competent and battle-ready” (RIA Novosti mistranslated it as “tested and battle-ready”). The press services of both Yulia Tymoshenko and Mikheil Saakashvili refused to comment on the tape’s authenticity.

The alleged conversation took place on Tuesday, the day after CEC’ refusal in registering Georgian observers. Since Wednesday, Ukrainian courts of first and second instances started intensive work. By the end of the week, verdicts were issued obligating the CEC to grant observer status to all Georgians. None of this however happened, because CEC members managed to depart to their regions, no quorum could be formed in Kyiv, hence no decisions issued. In the meantime, the Georgians have registered as media representatives. In case of necessary second round of elections, which is very likely, the first CEC meeting will grant Georgians their observer status. Altough by the time of publication, at least 4 Georgians have been arrested in Donetsk for various disturbances around polling areas [3].

How and why in the world did Georgia manage to take the frontline role in this comedy? The ugliest bit about this story is how RIA Novosti got a hold of the wiretapped conversation, if it is indeed authentic. It was handed over by Dmitry Vydrin, the deputy secretary of National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, and the former political science lecturer to Mikheil Saakashvili during his studies in Kyiv. It’s unclear where did he get the tape from in the first place, but he announced that the authenticity of the tape will be examined by Security Service of Ukraine and General Prosecution office [4]. Days before the elections, Vydrin hands over an alleged tape to a news agency based in another country, and only after that does the tape go to his native security services.

It seems Ukraine’s political chaos and Georgian toughs in Donetsk are somehow mutually complementary.

[1] http://www.rian.ru/politics/20100115/204630041.html
[2] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zweUkvJE64M
[3] http://www.rian.ru/incidents/20100117/204932089.html
[4] http://www.rian.ru/politics/20100115/204652966.html

Caucasus Watch is a biweekly roundup focusing on the region’s major stories. The project is led by Analyst Remy Gwaramadze with support from the entire Evolutsia.Net team. The next issue of Caucasus Watch will be published on January 17th. This issue’s late publication was due to the holidays.

In this issue, Analysts Inge Snip and Remy Gwaramadze looks into the diplomatic wrangling over the issue of the detained Georgian teenagers and their international implications. Also sending shockwaves, the demolished World War II memorial in Kutaisi kicks off not one, but two major controversies – in true Caucasus fashion. But those aren’t the only monoliths crumbling, as Georgia reconsiders its isolation-based policies towards the separatist regions. And while winter may be cold, intrigue surrounding Georgia is still red-hot with the strange tale of a Georgian cargo plane caught in Thailand with North Korean weapons.

All after the jump.

In this issue:

- The detention of Georgian Teens and the Underlying Reasons
- Demolition of World War II Memorial in Kutaisi
- Georgia Moderates Policies Towards the Separatist Territories
- Victor Bout’s Derisive Smile

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The Detention of the Georgian Teens and the Underlying Reasons
by Inge Snip, Remy Gwaramadze

Kiev and Warsaw | On the morning of November 4th, the South Ossetian Border Police captured and detained four young Georgian boys for the “illegal crossing of state borders,” and later adding the possession of “hand-grenades and explosives.” Being only between fourteen and seventeen years old, the imprisonment shocked many; not only Georgian officials made statements calling for the boys’ release, but also international actors got involved. On November 9th, the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia expressed its “profound concern” and demanded that in line with the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the South Ossetian authorities needed to treat the young boys appropriately. In addition, the European Union added on November 13th that it “urged for a rapid release of all detained persons.” Moreover, the Council of Europe also expressed its deep concern on November 17th and called for the boys’ immediate release.

Nevertheless, on November 19th the South Ossetian government decided to put the detainees in pre-trial custody, since they were not only illegally crossing the border, but also for allegedly being in possession of illegal explosives, ‘legalizing’ the imprisonment of the teens. However, the true reason for the detention became clearer: prisoners-swapping. After a refusal to take part in a mediation on the issue, Merab Chigoev, South Ossetian President Eduard Kokoity’s Deputy Envoy for post-conflict resolution issues, stated that three Ossetian citizens had been captured by Tbilisi and no information on them was available on their whereabouts and their situation. Thomas Hammarberg, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, said that indeed “there are people still detained on the both sides.”

Although this is a true fact, it does not diminishes the inappropriate detention of four underaged boys, not to be compared with adult detainees. Luckily, on December 2nd, the two youngest teenagers were released, after Georgia released five Ossetians; and on December 19 the other two were released, plus another teen that was already captured by the Ossetian side since July (only being fifteen years old).

However, after the exchange on December 2nd, when initially all the four teens would be freed, the South Ossetian authorities halted passing the two elder teens demanding more (up to forty) Ossetians kept by Georgian side to be set free. Some of them were detained long before the August War for severe criminal charges. According to Georgian authorities, all of them (detained before war) lived and operated in Georgia-controlled territories; in addition, three of detained Ossetians had been convicted and sentenced to lifetime imprisonment for terrorism; they were caught in 2005 after blowing up a car near police station in Gori, leaving three policeman dead and twenty-seven injured.

More interesting, however, is the story of another individual, who the South Ossetian authorities wanted to see released from Georgian custody: Nodar Dudayev (aka Marek Dudayev). Nodar was arrested in 2004 and convicted for twenty-three years in prison for blowing up railways near Mtskheta and several other crimes. Since Dudayev has been detained, his liberation has been demanded on a year-by-year base. According to Tbilisi officials, such exclusive efforts to bring him back could be connected to close relations between Eduard Kokoity and Erik Dudayev, the brother of Marek Dudayev.

During the civil war in 1991, Dudayev’s sister was killed and his mother was raped by Georgian forces, which might somewhat explain the South Ossetian authorities’ push for his release. On the other hand, Alan Parastayev, the former Minister of Interior and Supreme Judge of South Ossetia, admitted that he was forced to free Nodar Dudayev twice during his career. He also stated that Dudayev “was shooting” not only to Georgians but also Ossetians. “For a criminal, there is no nationality,” said Parastayev for RFE/RL’s Ekho Kavkaza radio [1].

Consequently, the abduction of the young Georgian teens can only be seen as just an element in Tskhinvali’s strange and corrupt system of patronage and control. In addition, such policies may have been conducted independently of Moscow, as the incident amounted to a severe hindrance to Russian diplomatic overtures during the high-profile NATO-Russia summit where new European defence strategy draft has been presented by the Russian side. In this light, an Russia-occupied Tskhinvali region is bad but an independent South Ossetia may be even worse. At the same time, Russia’s treatment of its Caucasus vassals has traditionally been to outsource control mostly to local warlords – in Chechnya it is Ramzan Kadyrov and in South Ossetia it is Kokoity – so Russia’s ability to rein in their proxies is normally somewhat subdued.

[1] See: http://realaudio.rferl.org/GR/2009/12/09/20091209-180000-GR-program.mp3

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Demolition of Warld War II Memorial in Kutaisi
by Remy Gwaramadze

Warsaw | Recently, Kutaisi became Georgia’s focus of controversy. The decision to move parliament sessions to Kutaisi had been endorsed earlier this year to help stimulate Georgia’s second largest city’s economy and prestige after years of neglect in favor of Tbilisi. But whether authorities like it or not, the whole project is now cursed with serious tragedy: a woman and her 8 year old daughter died on December 19th after being hit by a speeding block of concrete in their backyard during the demolition of the ‘Memorial of Fame’ where the new parliament building is to be established [1]. Part of the opposition gathered to begin protests anew (but failed), and the Russian spin machine did not stay far behind.

The great tragedy managed to obscure only for a short while the initial controversy about the monument itself, which commemorates the Georgians who fought their way through World War II battlefields, shoulder to shoulder with other nationalities of Soviet Union. Sensitive over Soviet times, Moscow was outraged with whole situation, hence, Russia charged that the blowing up of  the WWII Memorial was part of a broader campaign on ‘falsification of history.’ The Russian Ministry of Defence was keen to remind Georgia that theirs and Russia’s nation are connected by years of friendship. While this is definitely true in a cultural sphere, any military-related friendship ended with last year’s conflict, and I don’t think Russian Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov has to be reminded about that. In addition, Vladimir Putin echoed these claims, adding a heart-breaking proposal to recreate the monument in Moscow, ‘the capital of a once united state.’ One can see where his nostalgia lies, and it doesn’t seem to be in cultural friendship.

More important than the statement of Russia’s Prime Minister might be Zurab Nogaideli nodding at Putin’s words, shown on Russian state TV news during prime time. It’s hard to say if the former prime minister of Georgia and his Movement for Fair Georgia are going to form a pro-Russian force in Tbilisi, but it is for sure he is not going to be anti-Russian. Four visits in Moscow since September 2009 and a recent reception in Tskhinvali certainly prove Nogaideli’s courage. While he may have broken some ice, gotten technical issues done, and sent diplomatic signals, it almost certainly has costed him the high price of the “traitor” label and a certain political death in Georgia.

The problem of whole situation in Kutaisi is that it occurred in a country with a transitional status. Georgia is struggling to combine independent policy-making, political freedom and political stability. However, so far only the first part of that mix is justifiably fulfilled; post-Rose Revolution authorities act without Moscow’s opinion and often even at cross purposes of its Western allies, and it’s likely to remain this way. However, the facts of the case, the restoration and relocation of Memorial of Fame, and the responsibility of finding justice [2] seems to be drowning in a sea of pettiness, of a kind of freedom obsessed with Saakashvili’s alleged authoritarianism and megalomania. We have seen the birth of that freedom on April 9, 2009, when the opposition took to the streets and undisturbed remained there for months. Now what Georgia needs the most is that freedom to be filled with substance and constructive dialogue.

The task is to secure stability until political reshuffling for the 2013 presidential elections. Miheil Saakashvili has to pay more attention to internal public relations and reduce the incidence of ‘falling bricks,’ and even so, when the next brick fall off, it has to come down without such a rumble.

[1] Source: http://www.rferl.org/content/Georgia_Blows_Up_Soviet_War_Memorial_Two_People_Killed/1908415.html

[2] Source: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=21816

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Georgia Moderates Policies Towards Separatist Territories
by Remy Gwaramadze

Warsaw | At the end of the year, Georgia sent a powerful signal to the world. The draft paper with the working title “State Strategy towards Occupied Territories – Engagement through Cooperation” has been presented this week. The document not only discusses the discontinuation of isolation-based politics towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but also providing active measures to stimulate low-level cooperation. Areas of engagement include economic, education, healthcare and cultural projects, as well as through public diplomacy, people-to-people contacts including reopening of railway connection and bus traffic.According to the Georgian Minister of Reintegration, Temur Iakobashvili, who is behind the new strategy, a detailed work plan will be developed within next six months and presented before June 10, 2010 [1].

Such a move doesn’t seem like much of a surprise, as alternatives to ineffective isolation policies have been drawn up by Georgian opposition members and various commentator [2]. The switch in strategy is being made with the direct blessing of European Union and indirectly from Turkey. During the “Situation in Georgia” debate in the European Parliament on Dec. 15, European Commisioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner underlined the need of “strategic patience” and the “vanity” of isolationism. At the same time commitment for continuous support for Georgia’s territorial integrity has been expressed [3].

The other player, Turkey, can become a real deus ex machina, simply legalising and expanding their already active business presence in Abkhazia. It’s not a coincidence that on December 16th, the Ankara-based TEPAV think tank presented a report about Turkish engagement prospects in Abkhazia. “It is time for both the Turkish and Georgian governments to find practical ways to open up to Abkhazia and promote more active, more pro-engagement policy toward Abkhazia,” said Burcu Gültekin Punsmann, the report’s main contributor [4].

Another question that comes to mind is of a pragmatic nature. If the engagement policy is to work, it requires commitments from Sukhumi, Tskhinvali and Moscow. Why would they cooperate with the current Georgian government which is considered there to be aggressive? If they won’t, it would raise another paradox, at least for Abkhazia, which has expressed its openness to every kind of international relationship and should technically welcome Tbilisi’s move as de-facto recognition. Rebuffing Georgian overtures may rise some eyebrows in European capitals. “Why?” Brussels might ask, “Abkhazians told us they want to join Europe,  so we pushed Tbilisi to soften rhetorics and design changes. So why do reject them? Is it Russia their real course?”

My additional observation concerns the direct improvement of Georgia proper’s defense, as it eliminates a major casus belli for Russia – Tbilisi’s overall ‘aggresive’ policy towards ‘Russian citizens’ in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Defending and development of Georgia proper is unquestionably the main objective. Only after that is secured is genuine reconciliation possible.

[1] Source: http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=21830

[2] See: http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=4404

[3] See: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20091215+ITEM-016+DOC+XML+V0//EN

[4] Source: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/n.php?n=turkey-should-open-up-to-abkhazia-report-unveils-2009-12-16

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Victor Bout’s Derisive Smile
by Remy Gwaramadze

Warsaw | Try and get this. In a short period of time, the Kazakh East Wings Airlines sells an Il-76 cargo plane to Beibarys and another Kazakh Airlines. Then it’s sold to a Georgian airline. Air West Georgia’s formal base airport is Kopitnari/Kutaisi, Georgia, and a virtual address appears as Moscow/Vnukovo, Russia but registration data points to Babushara/Sukhumi, Abkhazia! Telephone number coincides with Abavia, an airline company also registered at Babushara. Before the August War, Abavia has been operating Moscow-Tbilisi charter connections. Base airport of Abavia, an airline registered in de facto independent Abkhazia, is Vaziani/Tbilisi, main base of the Georgian Air Force. Air West Georgia bounds the plane to an unspecified operator in Ukraine from where it flies to Asia. It carries loads an arms from North Korea and is busted a few weeks ago in Bangkok, Thailand with four Kazakhs and one Belorussian on board.

Portable missile systems, parts for ground-to-air missiles, grenades for grenade launchers and loads of regular rifle ammunition; in all about 35 tons of decent gear for militants. It’s clear that after another refill in Colombo, Sri Lanka, the cargo was supposed to reach recipients somewhere in the Middle East. Beside the inevitable speculation about it going to Afghanistan, it appears to be headed to Yemen concerning its ongoing civil war. Yemeni government troops allied with Saudi forces (and quietly backed by the West) squeeze Shiite rebels supported by Iran.

It is indeed an interesting, twisted story that raises two questions connected to Georgia, which alongside with Ukraine has been accused of illegal arms dealing activity. Major doubts concern Georgia’s crucial struggle against corruption. Transparency of major and middle-sized companies including current chaos in airlines has to be addressed. I also wonder whose airspace was used to fly quite a big machine unspotted from Ukraine to North Korea? Undoubtedly, there are many winks and nods going on in diplomatic circles about this incident, the subtext of which we may never fully learn. Victor Bout would be proud.

by Inge Snip

Georgia’s only LGBT organization was set upon by police for unknown reasons. Is this a harbinger of a new era of repression in Georgia? Analyst Inge Snip reports on this unexpected turn of events in the region’s ‘freest’ country.

Kiev | While it is known Georgia is not the most liberal country in the world when it comes to homosexuals, lesbians, bisexuals and transgenders (LGBT) – it has still remained somewhat possible – although secretly – to act upon your preferences. Georgia has always been an artistic society in which art is considered highly important, not trying to follow prejudices, but it is well-known that in artistic scenes, people are more eager to express their true selves. Therefore, I always thought in Georgia it was less discriminated upon than in many other post-soviet countries. How could I be so wrong? Did I naively forgot the role of the patriarch and religion? Perhaps, however, honestly, I am nevertheless shocked and repulsed with the latest police raid on LGBT defenders organization Inclusive Foundation and with the arrest of Paata Sabelashvili, their leader.

On December 15th, the police raided the organization, arrested Sabelashvili, stripped naked two woman in search for something, called them ’sick,’ ‘perverts’ and ’satanists’ and all without showing any search warrant; and unwilling to show one, one of the police officers said things such as:

“I will kill you!”

“I will tear you into pieces!”

“Sue me, I don’t give a damn”,

“I am myself the Law and the Judge!”

Not only is this a clear homophobic illegal action, but it is also a major violation of not just Georgia’s internal laws, but also international human rights law. The respect for minorities is embedded in all major human rights treaties, to which Georgia has signed and ought to respect. It’s also profoundly irrational for a country that trumpets its ‘Western’ credentials to be breaking down doors and persecuting the already marginalized LGBT community.

Herewith, I would like to bring your attention to the appeal the Inclusive Foundation has written to the President of Georgia, the Public Defender of Georgia, the Diplomatic Services accredited in Georgia and the representatives of International Organizations.

Instant Update: Rumor has that today, Saturday December 26th, Paata Sabelashvili has been released without further charges.

- Evolutsia.Net

by Michael Cecire

RFE/ RL is reporting that Georgian teachers are protesting in Tbilisi to demand unearned pay. While properly compensated educators should certainly be a priority, it is not a final objective. Educating students is the real goal.

Philadelphia | Georgian teachers are taking to the streets, according to a news report filed by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and posted on their website. The reason for the protests? Georgian teachers are demanding the Soviet-era customary “13th month” salary payment, which had been discontinued in recent years.

There is certainly a logic to this, especially considering that Georgia, despite a surprisingly resilient economy, has not gone unscathed by the global economic downturn. And teachers in Georgia, including in wealthier Tbilisi, are known for being poorly paid  and must often rely on private tutoring to make ends meet – an unofficial but widely-known practice that almost certainly negatively impacts classroom time. These pressures, aggravated by seemingly lavish government spending on things like holiday decorations and fanciful lighting, have compelled the protesters to gather on Rustaveli Avenue in front of the Parliament building and demand their share.

At the same time, Georgia’s public education system is in extremely poor shape. While the country certainly has many terrific teachers, antiquated teaching methods and a deeply rooted culture of seniority over merit – not to mention the decided lack of performance standards and the very real conflict of interest of private tutoring versus classroom instruction – make the protesters’ demands difficult to accept. But, yet again, many of the problems that inhibit quality teaching stem from a lack of sufficient public investment.

Georgia might consider developing parallel school districts – like that of the Recovery School District of New Orleans, Louisiana, which has seen tremendous improvement in teacher and student performance by embracing key performance standards, charter schools, and salary incentives for teachers [1]. Georgia would do well to remake the system, piece-by-piece, to not only put education back on track – which languishes in performance, as measured by the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Rankings [2] – but to also properly motivate and compensate professional educators.

Either way, the solution is certainly not to be found in resurrecting an old, and somewhat irrational, Soviet custom. While it may put a little more cash into the pockets of teachers, it it unlikely to improve education standards or prove to be a sustainable solution to Georgia’s education problems. Such money would be better invested in reforming the system entirely.

Photo: Former First Lady and educator Laura Bush Speaks with Georgian First Lady Sandra Roelofs about education. Source: Wikimedia Commons.

Footnotes

[1] See: http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200701/waldman-katrina

[2] Source: http://investor.ge/issues/2009_5/02.htm